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STRANGER THAN FICTION: AN “INSIDE” LOOK
AT ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND DEFENSE
STRATEGY IN THE DEEPWATER HORIZON
AFTERMATH
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Jason DeRosa & Sarah Reyneveld*
Abstract: The Deepwater Horizon oil spill of April 20, 2010 initiated an
environmental disaster that presented attorneys on both sides of the legal action
with monumental challenges. Using the satirical format of a memo written by
the corporate defense counsel to BP America four days after the spill began, this
article investigates BP’s potential liability and strategic defense positions
available in criminal and civil proceedings. Major federal environmental laws,
including the Oil Pollution Act, the Clean Water Act and major wildlife
protection statutes, are implicated by the Spill. The memo provides a clear
picture of the existing opportunities for a responsible party to minimize liability
in the face of incriminating evidence. This article argues that the successful use
of legal precedents, tactical defenses and the enhanced role of the responsible
party in response and restoration, will minimize BP America’s liability and civil
and criminal penalties resulting from the Spill, to the detriment of the
prevention of future environmental crimes.
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Author’s Note: This is a completely fictional Memorandum of
Law from BP Counsel to their clients on Day Four of the
Macondo Well Oil Spill (April 24, 2010). That is, future events
have not unfolded and must be predicted or imagined. The
citations are not fictional.
Date:
To:
From:
Re:

I.

April 24, 2010
BP America, Inc.
Bendini, Lambert & Locke, Attorneys at Law1
Initial Memorandum of Law Discussing
Representation of BP on Matters Pertaining to
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Well Blowout

INTRODUCTION

As the lawyers for BP America (BP), this is our initial
strategy memorandum discussing how we intend to address
your company’s liability stemming from the sudden misfortune
at your Macondo Well on April 20 of this year.
We must assure BP that in the post-Exxon Valdez Spill era,
the U.S. system of environmental law is formidable and

* Professor William H. Rodgers is the Stimson Bullitt Professor of Law at the
University of Washington School of Law. Jason DeRosa and Sarah Reyneveld are 2011
graduates of the University of Washington School of Law. Appreciation is expressed
for the research and ideas of the students in the class of LAW B565 U.S. Coastal &
Ocean Law, University of Washington, School of Law, Autumn 2010: Jeffrey Barnum,
Peter C. Boome, Amanda Cardenas, Chih Chen, Angela Cook, Wyatt Golding, Joyce
Heinan, Sarah Jordan, Jason Kovacs, Sara Leverette, Kenny Wei, Brooke Williams,
Taylor Wonhoff, Xi Yang.
1. Bendini, Lambert & Locke is a fictional law firm featured in the John Grisham
book and movie, The Firm. See Michael Asimow, Embodiment of Evil: Law Firms in
the Movies, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1339, 1353 (2001).
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punitive, and BP’s potential liabilities are significant and vast.
The system, however, is complex and full of legal defenses that
our team is ready to exploit. BP faces risk on five legal fronts:
criminal liability, civil penalties payable to the United States,
civil damages owed to private parties, response costs and
natural resource damages payable to the United States, the
affected States and possibly Indian tribes.
The Gulf Oil Spill2 caused ecological devastation, fatalities
and significant economic loss to the Gulf coast. The case for
criminal prosecution rests on the fact that the unprecedented
damage caused by the disaster and the loss of eleven lives
might have been avoided if BP had adhered to safety
standards and a standard of care greater than that shown in
the lead-up to the disaster. The spill caused catastrophic
ecological devastation and BP is likely liable for violating
wildlife statutes because of the harm and death of thousands of
birds, sea turtles, marine mammals and fish. The culpability
standard and our available defenses vary depending on the
wildlife (birds, mammals, or endangered species) harmed.
BP is also vulnerable to criminal liability under the Clean
Water Act (CWA) if there is any evidence of corner cutting,
measured safety risks and deviation from industry standards.
If the Department of Justice (DOJ) commences a suit, BP will
be charged with violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA) for
negligently discharging into navigable waters. If the DOJ can
prove that the discharge occurred knowingly, BP will also be
charged with a violation of the “knowing endangerment”
provision of the CWA.3 Further, ten or fifteen of your top
executives and decision-makers (“responsible corporate
officers”) could be charged with offenses resulting in actual
prison sentences for the felony of criminal endangerment.
While it is within the realm of possibility, the likelihood that
individual BP executives will be prosecuted is slim.
Finally, BP should assume that the Department of Justice
(DOJ) is investigating the “debarment option,” which could
eliminate BP’s current and future contracts with the American
government and military.4 BP’s history of cost-cutting
2. Though most people will call this the “BP Oil Spill” we urge you to use the term
“Gulf Oil Spill.”
3. 33 U.S.C § 1319(c)(2) (2006).
4. E.g., id. § 1368(a) (prohibiting federal contracting with any person under the
Clean Water Act “until the Administrator certifies that the condition giving rise to
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measures have led to three earlier criminal convictions—for
activities in Endicott Bay, Texas City and Prudhoe Bay—
which could be considered in weighing the more serious
debarment option.5 The sheer size and importance of BP to
America’s economic and security interest will likely prevent
these accumulated resentments from resulting in complete
debarment.
BP’s negligence authorizes DOJ to seek hefty civil penalties
under the CWA. The Act’s civil penalty provision will likely
impose significant financial burdens for BP. The clear risk
under the CWA is a civil fine of $1,110 per barrel of oil spilled
and $4,300 per barrel if the company is proven to be grossly
negligent.6 Based on your early estimate that the Macondo
Well is leaking five thousand barrels per day, civil penalties
could reach $21.5 million per day. If the spill continues for 100
days, or if your estimate is low by a factor of 100, the fine is
$2.15 billion; if both, the fine is $21.5 billion.7 Our firm will
need to work closely with BP on this highly sensitive topic and
must have a confidential discussion on the actual rate of flow
and your methods for calculating it. Because the law uses

such conviction has been corrected”). The federal government continues to award
contracts to BP. See Contracts for Thursday, May 12, 2011, Department of Defense,
http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=4533 (last visited Dec. 2,
2011) (indicating that BP was awarded a Department of Defense contract in May
2011).
5. See Abraham Lustgarten, Furious Growth and Cost Cuts Led to BP Accidents Past
and
Present,
PROPUBLICA
(Oct.
26,
2010,
10:32
AM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/bp-accidents-past-and-present (discussing, generally,
debarment and the various problems that led to investigation).
6. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(D) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2006) (stating that any
discharge of oil that is a result of gross negligence of any owner or operator will toll
toward the negligent party at a maximum of $3,000); see also Civil Monetary Penalty
Inflation Adjustment Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 30, 7121, 7124 (Feb. 13, 2004) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 19, 27) (stating that the §1321 civil penalty for oil discharge will have a
new maximum violation amount of $4,300 per barrel).
7. See NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMAND, INTERAGENCY SOLUTIONS GROUP, FLOW RATE
TECHNICAL GROUP, ASSESSMENT OF FLOW RATE ESTIMATES FOR THE DEEPWATER
HORIZON / MACONDO WELL OIL SPILL 1–2 (2011). Three days after a capping stack was
installed on the well on July 12, 2010, the choke valve was closed and oil stopped
flowing into the Gulf. Three different teams from Department of Energy (DOE) labs
used pressure measurements recorded as the valve was closed to yield the most precise
and accurate estimation of flow from the Macondo well: 53,000 barrels/day at the time
just prior to shut in.; see also WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG & ROBERT GRAMLING,
BLOWOUT IN THE GULF: THE BP OIL SPILL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF ENERGY IN
AMERICA 13 (MIT Press 2011) (stating BP’s initial estimates were two percent of
actual volume).
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various techniques for measuring and estimating flow, our
firm must learn from BP about the fine distinctions between
actual flow, measured flow, perceived flow and disguised flow.
The law will permit any techniques for measuring and
estimating flow that passes its gatekeeping test.8 The ongoing
flow from the Macondo Well represents a hemorrhaging of BP’s
financial resources.
All strategy and planning will be measured by reference to
the 1989 spill of the Exxon Valdez, where a tanker collided
with Bligh Reef and let loose eleven million gallons of North
Slope crude oil into Prince William Sound. This oil spill has
every prospect of surpassing Exxon Valdez in geography
affected, amounts spilled, duration, impacts and legal and
political retaliation.9
Civil damages, for matters such as lost profits for the Gulf
tourism industry, curtailed fishing, lost tourism and
destruction of personal livelihood, are potentially vast. BP
should recognize, however, that the entire fury of the U.S.
personal injury and class action bar limped home in the Exxon
Valdez spill case with damages around $500 million. Double
that to account for the punitive damages, and the entire bill
came to rest at a figure of perhaps one billion dollars.10 BP’s
civil liability damages, for reasons of time of year (fishing and
spawning seasons) and adjacency of the spill to heavy
commercial and recreational activity, will be many times more
extravagant than those suffered by Exxon—we will start with
fifteen billion dollars as an early estimate. Our firm has
developed several strategies for limiting this loss, explained in
8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993)
(identifying the following four nonexclusive factors that contribute to judicial decisions
on admissibility of scientific methodologies such as measuring flow rate: (1) whether
the technique has been subjected to peer review or publications, (2) the “known or
potential rate of error,” (3) a “reliability assessment,” in which the “degree of
acceptance” within a scientific community may be determined, and (4) the “testability”
of the technique).
9. Compare THE SPILL: PERSONAL STORIES FROM THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER 19–
21 (Sharon Bushell & Stan Jones eds., Epicenter Press 2009) [hereinafter 2009
PERSONAL STORIES] with FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 11–13 and
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE OIL
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 129–71 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 NATIONAL
COMMISSION REPORT].
10. See Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (holding $507.5 million in
compensatory damages reasonable and 1:1 ratio of compensatory-to-punitive damages
as the maximum punitive damage award).
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Part III of this memo, that may ensure economic harms to the
BP Corporation will be kept within reason.
In this respect, we recommend a national publicity
campaign that duplicates the strategy successfully mounted by
Exxon more than twenty years ago. You must pledge, in
various open letters to the public, to pay all “legitimate claims”
and to make everybody “whole.”11 These pledges aim to build
up public confidence and good will toward BP; we will strive to
pay all legitimate claims. Additionally, Exxon’s success in
curtailing punitive damages in U.S. maritime law is of direct
legal benefit to BP in the Gulf. BP may recall that a federal
jury returned a five billion dollar verdict against Exxon for
punitive damages arising out of the 1989 spill.12 Some fourteen
years later the U.S. Supreme Court overturned this
judgment.13
As you know, total liability under the Oil Pollution Act
(OPA) shall not exceed “the total of all removal costs plus
$75,000,000.”14 These limits on liability can be overcome if the
incident was “proximately caused by” gross negligence or
willful misconduct or by “the violation of an applicable Federal
safety, construction, or operating regulation.”15 BP is clearly on
the hook for “all removal costs plus $75,000,000” and might be
potentially responsible for liabilities beyond that upon a
showing of “gross negligence” and “willful misconduct.”16
We applaud BP’s initial response to this matter—declaring
that any caps or limits are “not relevant” to your calculations.17
11. Compare Press Release, BP America Inc., BP Pledges Collateral for Gulf of
Mexico Oil Spill Trust, (Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do
?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7065280 with Jane Eisemann, Kodiak Resident, in
2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 183 (“we will make you whole”).
12. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 480 (referencing jury award).
13. Id.
14. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006).
15. Id. § 2704(c)(1)(A), (B).
16. See 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 217-47 (explaining
that much of the fault leading up to the disaster is the result of systemic problems in
government oversight and industry/institutional culture, but also that BP’s “safety
culture” had failed). See also 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006).
17. See White House: Lift Liability Cap for Gulf Oil Spill, CBS (Mar. 25, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/04/politics/main6460911.shtml
(“Asked
whether the company expected to spend money beyond the $75 million limit, Hayward
said the cap was largely irrelevant. It’s got nothing to do with caps. All legitimate
claims will be honored.” ); see also Shaila Dewan, Officials Ask BP to Assure It Will
Cover
Spill
Claims,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
16,
2010),
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BP limited the amount of public information regarding its
views on liability, but we have room to fill in the details. BP’s
position can be charitably characterized as declining to exploit
legal technicalities that tilt in the company’s direction.
The best way to control BP’s “response costs” is to manage
them adroitly and as cheaply as possible. BP took important
steps in this direction by hiring work crews and sinking,
burning or burying the oil and debris.18 The more oil BP loses
at sea, the less the company must bring ashore for what is
likely an expensive disposal of “hazardous waste.”19 Similarly,
in Part II, we demonstrate how to position BP within the
multi-agency process measuring the spill’s impact on nature
known as the natural resource damage assessment. We
emphasize minimizing interim resources losses—the lost value
of natural resources tolling between the spill and restoration—
will help BP’s bottom line. This can be accomplished if we can
start restoration projects as quickly as possible, regardless of
how successful they might be. Moving through the “science”
phase of the natural resource damage assessment process
rapidly is in BP’s best interest. Let us turn to the particulars of
the five-front legal war BP is confronted with and our
preliminary recommendations on how to proceed.
II.

THE EXXON VALDEZ SPILL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE BP DEFENSE

The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill was brilliantly defended by
Exxon. That experience created a useful collection of legal
precedents and tactical advice for BP to employ in the current
crisis. Exxon functionally escaped from any and all criminal
sanctions20—a feat BP would be fortunate to replicate. Exxon

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/us/16spill.html ($75 million cap “irrelevant.”).
18. CARL SAFINA, A SEA IN FLAMES: THE DEEPWATER HORIZON BLOWOUT, PART II
(Random House 2011) (“A Season of Anguish”).
19. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING, CHIEF COUNSEL’S REPORT, MACONDO: THE GULF OIL DISASTER
151 (2011) (footnotes omitted) (“Rather, according to internal BP emails and the
testimony of various witnesses, BP chose to use the lost circulation [materials] as a
spacer in order to avoid having to dispose of the material as hazardous waste pursuant
to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).”).
20. See William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al., The Exxon Valdez Reopener: Natural
Resources Damage Settlements and Roads Not Taken, 22 ALASKA. L. REV. 135, 149–51
(2005) [hereinafter The Exxon Valdez Reopener] (fines assessed are “remitted”).
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shattered the ambitions of the civil lawyers by destroying the
cultural and subsistence claims of the one group enjoying
widespread public support—Alaska natives21—and by
undermining the natural resource claims of sport fishing
interests, a group endowed with impressive political capital.22
Exxon also inflicted irreparable damage to the U.S. jury
system by the creative expedient of secretly “buying” a share of
the “punitive damages” that was owned by the so-called
Seattle Seven fishing companies.23 This was done at
substantial discount and inflicted disarray on the united front
of the opposition. Further, it created a valuable example of the
use of corporate buying power that can be invoked to
undermine juries.24
Exxon’s success in curtailing punitive damages in U.S.
maritime law creates a direct legal benefit for BP in the Gulf
spill. BP may recall that a federal jury returned a five billion
dollar verdict against Exxon for punitive damages arising out
of the Exxon Valdez spill.25 In hard-fought litigation, up and
down in the courts, this $5 billion judgment became $4 billion,
then $4.5 billion, then $2.5 billion26 and eventually $.5 billion
in the U.S. Supreme Court.27 In 2008, nineteen years after the
initial spill, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the $5 billion
verdict28 and completely dashed the financial expectations and
staying power of 32,000 out-of-work fishermen.29 The “rule” of
the case, for reasons of fairness to Exxon and the potential for
odious overreaching by the common people of the jury, is that
21. Id. at 144. See also Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.
1997) (explaining that Alaska Native “subsistence lifestyle” claims arising out of the
spill are not a special injury for purposes of a public nuisance action).
22. Id. at 180–81. See also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769,
771–73 (9th Cir. 1994).
23. The Exxon Valdez Reopener, supra note 20, at 186–87.
24. Id.
25. In Re The Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2006).
26. See id (explaining the different awards entered in the case).
27. See Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (adopting the District
Court’s calculation of total relevant compensatory damages).
28. See id.
29. Twenty-six thousand lived to see the ruling. Compare RIKI OTT, NOT ONE DROP:
BETRAYAL AND COURAGE IN THE WAKE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL, epilogue
(Chelsea Green Pub. 2008) (discussing the “shock” of hearing about the Supreme Court
decision) with 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 258–59 (quoting Dennis
Kragin, a Kodiak Fisherman, “I used to say, ‘Exxon is going to pay us. We’ll get paid,
we’ll get paid.’ . . . I’ll believe it when I see it.”).
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punitive damages should not exceed the actual damages
suffered by the fishermen. That is, the case set forth a one-toone ratio for punitive and actual damages.30
This one-to-one ratio rule can be of considerable future
benefit to BP if the case moves in the direction of punitive
damages, which is likely.31 For reasons that entirely escape our
firm, damages to natural resources do not figure in the ratio
calculations for determining punitive damages. Thus the one
billion dollars Exxon committed for natural resource damages
compensation did not earn one penny in punitive damages.
(Let us assume that the beaches do not care that they were
heavily oiled and the soiled birds are entirely indifferent to the
prospects of vengeance). Thus, this one-to-one precedent is
tantalizingly benign to our future legal prospects and we are
happy to have it.
On the natural resource damages front, Exxon arguably
outgunned the natural resource “trustees”—the sobriquet
extended to the United States and the State of Alaska. Out of
the one billion dollar settlement for natural resources
damages, $900 million was distributed over time to the Exxon
Valdez Trustee Council.32 In a novel move, Exxon deferred
payment of $100 million of these funds under a seemingly
“harmless” reopener provision.33 The “trustees” struggled to
meet a fifteen-year deadline to seek additional damages by
June 1, 2006. The hastily framed “demand” that was developed
was never paid or pursued; Exxon successfully stonewalled the
whole affair.34 This bold corporate display of determination
and conviction bought several more years of legal paralysis.35
Right now, important legal and scientific elements of the
natural resource damages remain entirely unresolved, well
past the twenty-first anniversary of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
Time is on our side, and the Exxon experience underscores the
30. See Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 512–513 (2008) (stating that a 1:1
ratio is a “fair upper limit in maritime cases.”).
31. Id.
32. The Exxon Valdez Reopener, supra note 20, at 135.
33. Id. at 138–39.
34. See generally William Yardley, 22 Years Later, the Exxon Valdez Case is Back in
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/us/04
exxon.html.
35. Def.’s Mot. to Enforce Consent Decree, United States v. Exxon Corp., No. 3:91-sv0082 Civil (HRH) (D.Alaska, Aug. 9, 2011) (an affirmative ruling here would bring an
end to the “reopener”).
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legal arsenal that can be put to the ready service of extended
delay. Though we cannot bet on the reliable bungling of our
adversaries, we are ready to exploit these opportunities if the
occasion arises. Based on this approach, we recommend the
following defenses addressing the five legal categories BP will
likely confront.
III. RECOMMENDED DEFENSES IN THE FIVE MAJOR
CATEGORIES
A.

BP’s Criminal Liability

The Gulf Oil Spill has been called America’s “worst
environmental disaster.”36 If the Department of Justice (DOJ)
brings criminal charges against BP, the charges will likely
allege violations of several wildlife statutes, which are
misdemeanors, and violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA),
which may be more severe. The DOJ will likely charge BP with
violations of the CWA for negligently and/or knowingly
discharging into navigable waters. The DOJ may charge BP’s
executives with criminal fraud based on evidence that they
exaggerated the company’s cleanup capacity and the time
needed for spilled oil to reach the shore. Additionally, BP may
be charged with violating the Seaman’s Manslaughter
Statute,37 which provides felony sanctions for a vessel owner
whose negligence causes the death of a worker on board the
vessel. BP’s potential criminal liability, applicable defenses
and our recommendations follow.
1.

The Wildlife Statutes

As BP knows, the Gulf is home to an array of sensitive and
valuable species, many of which have been adversely affected
by the current spill. The U.S. government has three applicable
statutes aimed at protecting these species, which may create
some liability for BP. First, if the DOJ commences a criminal
suit, BP will likely be liable for violating the Migratory Bird
36. See 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT , supra note 9, at 173 (quoting
President Obama, Oval Office Speech of June 15, 2010); see also Jerry Cope, The
Crime of the Century: What BP and the US Government Don’t Want You to Know, THE
HUFFINGTON
POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-cope/the-crime-of-thecentury_b_662971.html (last visited June 16, 2011).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006).
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Treaty Act (MBTA). Under the MBTA, the “taking” of a
migratory bird “by any means or in any manner” is unlawful.38
For misdemeanors, liability is strict,39 which means it is
unnecessary to prove intent to cause the death of birds. The
Gulf Oil Spill has already killed thousands of birds, making BP
liable under this Act.40
Additionally, because the Gulf Oil Spill killed marine
mammals, BP may be liable for violating the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA).41 Like the MBTA, violations of the
MMPA are misdemeanors, but the MMPA imposes a higher
culpability standard by requiring violations to be done
“knowingly.”42 This higher standard does not place such a
charge out of reach, especially with the spilling of large
amounts of oil. BP may also be liable for violating the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). Under the ESA, it is a
misdemeanor43 to “take,” meaning to wound, harass, or kill,44 a
member of a species protected by the Act.45 Here, too, the
prosecution must establish a knowing violation.46 This means
the actor must anticipate the spill and know that it will cause
harm to the species.47
38. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2010) (defining “take” as “pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.”).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a).
40. A CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY REPORT, A DEADLY TOLL: THE GULF OIL
SPILL AND THE UNFOLDING WILDLIFE DISASTER 1 (2011) (estimating death or harm to
82,000 birds).
41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1362(13), 1362(18)(A) (2006) (defining harassment as “any act of
pursuit, torment, or annoyance which (i) has the potential to injure a marine mammal
. . . or (ii) has the potential to disturb a marine mammal ... by causing disruption of
behavioral patterns.”).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1375(b) (under the MMPA, a “person who knowingly violates any
provision of this subchapter or of any permit or regulation issued thereunder [not
including takings by commercial fishing operations] shall, upon conviction, be fined
not more than $20,000 for each such violation, or imprisoned for not more than one
year, or both”); see also United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“Under the MMPA, no criminal penalty can attach for negligent conduct.”).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b) (2006) (limiting the punishment for violation to one year in
prison and/or a fine of $50,000).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006) (defining the term “take” to mean, inter alia,
harassing, harming, killing, or wounding).
45. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(A)–(B) (stating that it is unlawful to “take” any endangered
species within the United States or the territorial Seas of the United States or to take
endangered species on the high seas).
46. Id. § 1540(b) (2006) (“Knowingly violate . . . any provision of this chapter, or any
provision of any permit or certificate issued hereunder.”) (emphasis added).
47. See United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 1998)
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2.

Clean Water Act

Under the CWA, it is a misdemeanor to discharge a
pollutant negligently into navigable waters48 and a felony to do
so knowingly.49 BP is vulnerable to a criminal suit under the
negligence provisions because the evidence suggests that it
took measurable safety risks and exercised a lack of reasonable
care in observing industry standards leading up to the
Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and after the blowout. With
damage estimates upwards of twenty billion dollars, BP is
potentially on the hook to receive the largest corporate
criminal fine imposed in U.S. history.50 This fine is imposed
based on an ordinary negligence standard. Such negligence is
not difficult to prove51 and it may be coincidentally established
in the course of the ongoing investigations of the accident.52
BP should be concerned with this relaxed liability standard
in light of the prospect that BP’s management process failed to
adequately identify or address the risks created by late
changes to well design and procedures.53 Evidence is
accumulating on your company’s failure to evaluate adequately
cumulative risks stemming from the cement job, including
dangerous drilling decisions, a low rate of cement flow and
cement volume and fewer centralizers than were anticipated in
(explaining that the ESA required only that defendant knew he was shooting an
animal when defendant shot a protected wolf); United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp.
1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988) (holding that it was sufficient to show that the defendant
knowingly took an animal even though he thought he was taking a different
unprotected species); United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(holding that in prosecution under the ESA, government need only prove that the
hunter acted with general intent when he shot animal in question); see also KRISTINA
ALEXANDER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R41308, THE 2010 OIL SPILL:
CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER WILDLIFE LAWS (2010).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2006).
49. Id. § 1319(c)(2).
50. Id. § 1319(c)(3)(A). See 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2006) (stating that under the
Alternative Fines Act the maximum criminal penalty for the Clean Water Act
violations is twice the losses resulting from the oil spill).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). See United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir.
2005) (stating that a person “violates the Clean Water Act by failing to exercise the
degree of care that someone of ordinary prudence would have exercised in the same
circumstances, and, in so doing discharges [in violation of the Act]”).
52. See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, INTERIM REPORT ON CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER
OIL SPILL AND WAYS TO PREVENT SUCH EVENTS 5–9 (Nov. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13047.html [hereinafter 2010 INTERIM REPORT].
53. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 125.
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the original design.54 Thus, as investigations continue, we fear
the doors will close on the defenses to negligence.55
Additionally, the CWA has long been celebrated for its
invention of the crime of “knowing endangerment.”56
Conviction requires proof of violation of the no-discharge
provisions coupled with additional evidence that the doer of
the deed “knows at that time that he thereby places another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.”57
Penalties include fines up to $250,000 (one million dollars for
an “organization”) “or imprisonment of not more than 15 years,
or both.”58 If the DOJ can prove that BP knew that the
company’s failure to take reasonable care in its offshore
drilling operations would result in the Spill, then it may be
able to prove “knowing endangerment” under the CWA.59
Frankly, the knowing and negligence provisions of the CWA
place the future of BP—and any number of its executives—
firmly within the discretionary mercy of the DOJ.
The felony provisions of the CWA establish two prominent
proof advantages for environmental prosecutors. One is a
tempered version of “knowingly” that appears in the context of
environmental crime.60 The other is the so-called “responsible
corporate officer” doctrine.61
The leading decision is Judge Betty Fletcher’s ruling in
United States v. Weitzenhoff,62 which comes down in favor of
the prosecution on the question of “whether ‘knowingly’ means
a knowing violation of the law or simply knowing conduct that

54. Id. at 97–98. (finding “BP installed only six centralizer subs on the Macondo
production casting. BP’s original designs called for 16 or more centralizers to be placed
along the long string.”).
55. 2010 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 52, at 5–9.
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (2006).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See David Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental
Crime, and the Criminal Act, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1431 (2011) (suggesting that the
DOJ could allege BP knowingly discharged oil into the Gulf due to the risks taken by
the company and its partners).
60. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc)
(holding “knowingly” language in CWA does not require proof that defendant knew he
was violating the law).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c)(5) (defining “person” to include a “responsible corporate
officer.”).
62. 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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is violative of the law.”63 This ruling deprives a CWA
defendant of any number of the “didn’t-know,” “unaware-ofthe-technicalities,” “nobody-told-me,” or “just-doing-my-job”
defenses that customarily surface in any “complex”
technological undertaking such as offshore oil drilling. Indeed,
Judge Kleinfeld said in his Weitzenhoff dissent that the CWA
reaches too far, declaring that “[t]his statute has tremendous
sweep. Most statutes permit anything except what is
prohibited, but this one prohibits all regulated conduct
involving waters and wetlands except what is permitted.”64
Judge Kleinfeld also argued that the CWA regulates “[m]uch
more ordinary, innocent, productive activity. . .than people not
versed in environmental law might imagine,”65 and that it
“makes felons of a large number of innocent people doing
socially valuable work.”66
In Weitzenhoff, admittedly, this “socially valuable work” was
done by “midnight dumpers.”67 The defendants “managed a
sewer plant and told their employees to dump 436,000 pounds
of sewage into the ocean, mostly at night, fouling a nearby
beach.”68 It is difficult to sympathize with a manager who
ordered his employees to
dump intentionally hazardous
sewage. While our firm will strongly advocate that the Gulf Oil
Spill was a terrible accident, many will feel the same lack of
sympathy about BP’s corner-cutting on the Deepwater
Horizon.
The Weitzenhoff holding continues to aid prosecutors by
squeezing “knowingly” defenses down to something closer to
sleepwalking and inviting convictions for public welfare
wrongs that are designed to stem the abuses of modern
industrialism.69 However, under Wietzenhoff, we will claim
that the prosecutor must prove that “knowingly” committed
cost-cutting measures resulted in a discharge of oil into the
Gulf. However, BP cannot claim any “socially valuable work”
or “unfortunate accident” defenses.

63. Id. at 1283.
64. Id. at 1293.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1294.
68. Id.
69. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Similarly, environmental prosecution is aided by the CWA’s
recognition that a “person” vulnerable to criminal prosecution
includes “any responsible corporate officer.”70 Again, this
undercuts the ignorance defense for those who might not have
known but should have known of the circumstances. A number
of mid-level and other managers have met their felony fates
under the criminal environmental laws that have told them
that their knowledge of serious environmental risks is not up
to par.71 Reluctantly, we read the case law as allowing U.S.
prosecutors to thrust criminal environmental law deeply into
the ranks of BP’s onshore management should they choose to
go there.72
3.

Criminal Fraud

Additionally, as your counsel, we are concerned that
adversaries will contend that BP seized the basic planning and
licensing process of offshore oil development and turned it into
a fabrication factory. Every business executive who aspires to
tangle with the United States should memorize the criminal
fraud provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), which reads in
pertinent part:
. . . whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully—
1. falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact;
2. makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation; or
3. makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
70. Clean Water Act § 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2006). See also Nancy
Mullikan, Holding the “Responsible Corporate Officer” Responsible: Addressing the
Need for Expansion of Criminal Liability For Corporate Environmental Violators, 3
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 395 (Spring 2010).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990) (convicting three
civilian managers and contractors of knowingly managing hazardous wastes without a
permit).
72. We understand that “BP onshore” participated in the vital decisions at Macondo.
See 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 125 (Fig. 4.10: Examples of
Decisions That Increased Risk at Macondo While Potentially Saving Time).

234 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:2

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both.73
To this end, it is imperative that BP’s management
understands that it is a felony to falsify a material fact in any
document submitted to an agency of the United States and
that filling a report with fabrications might lead to multiple
felony charges. Thus, evidence that BP employees’ falsified
conditions at the well, either in the amount of oil discharged or
in the response plan, could result in a felony charge.74
Based on this law, BP will perhaps appreciate why our firm
must scrutinize, with a growing sense of apprehension, BP’s
582-page Oil Spill Response Plan covering all BP operations in
the Gulf of Mexico. This document has not received glowing
reviews from our associates because of its far-fetched and
unsupported claims.75 The document asserts, for example, that
BP has an “amazing collection of skimming equipment” that
would enable it to clean up an incredible 20,652,282 gallons of
oil per day—roughly twice the volume of the Exxon Valdez
spill.76 How could this possibly be true? The plan also “claimed
there would be only a 21 percent chance that oil from a spill
would reach the Louisiana coast within a month.”77 But this
cannot be true either.78 This spill response plan refers readers
to experts long since dead79 and expresses “concern for
walruses, sea otters, sea lions and seals, including all of them
under the heading ‘sensitive biological resources’—even though
not a single one of them has lived in the Gulf for the last
several million years.”80 Despite these lapses, we are confident
in our firm’s ability to defend any fraud charges based on our
considerable past successes. In these cases, our general tactic
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
74. Id. See also id. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512, and 1519 (obstructing justice).
75. See FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 53–55 (quoting LEE CLARKE,
MISSION IMPROBABLE: USING FANTASY DOCUMENTS TO TAME DISASTER (1999 U.
Chicago Press)).
76. Id. at 53.
77. Id. at 54.
78. See id. (“[T]he actual spill, with a probability of 100 percent, took only nine days
to start fouling the coastline”).
79. See id. (“The go-to wildlife expert listed in the plan, Professor Peter Lutz of the
University of Miami, had left that institution twenty years earlier, and in a
particularly inconvenient detail, he had died four years before the plan was
approved.”).
80. Id.
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is to argue that a particularly outrageous false statement is
not a fact but an opinion, that if it is a fact it is not material,
that if it is material, it was not relied upon, and that if it is
relied upon, the statement was not uttered with the requisite
degree of culpability.
Specifically, to defend matters mentioned above, we will
argue that BP’s overestimation of cleanup capacity and the
time needed for spilled oil to reach the shore are matters of
opinion and references to available experts and walruses are
entirely immaterial. It helps in cases of this sort to have an
agency so complacent81 as to be information-oblivious. Fraud
as a legal concept is fundamentally designed to prevent
miscalculations by the party deceived.82 No one believes the
Minerals Management Service (MMS) could be led astray by a
few careless references to walruses.
But we insist that you understand that deception cannot be
the policy of choice when dealing with the federal government.
As a matter of principle, our firm might agree with BP that a
freedom to fabricate is part and parcel of corporate free speech
on the international stage.83 We point out to you that there is a
right way and a wrong way to change these rules. The path is
open for BP to diminish the importance of the “material false
statement” law84 by dissuading the Attorney General from
81. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transparency, Accountability, and Competency: An
Essay on the Obama Administration, Google Government, and the Difficulties of
Securing Effective Governance, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 455 (2011) (“MMS employees
received free trips and even illicit drugs and the services of paid sex workers from
industry representatives. In turn, the MMS turned a blind eye on various and sundry
applications for drilling permits.”); Tim Dickinson, The Spill, The Scandal and the
President, ROLLING STONE, June 24, 2010, at 54 (“[President Obama] acknowledged
that his administration had failed to adequately reform the Minerals Management
Service, the scandal-ridden federal agency that for years had essentially allowed the
oil industry to self-regulate.”).
82. See generally N. Anna Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 533 F.2d
655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no loss of license for facility because the fault on which it was
sited was not “capable”); Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
571 F.2d 1289, 1291–92 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (affirming civil penalties of
$32,500 for the making of false statements in connection with an application for a
license to construct a nuclear power plant).
83. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144–45
(1961) (Black, J.) (stating that no Sherman Act violation can be premised upon a “noholds-barred fight” between railroads and truckers to influence the passage of state
laws); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (“Noerr shields
from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of
intent or purpose.”).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
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enforcing this law. Unfortunately, it is beyond the power of BP
to wash this law away with a flood of indifferent violations.
4.

Defenses to Criminal Liability

If BP is rendered criminally vulnerable by tough
environmental laws, prosecution-friendly doctrines, and the
familiar practice of multiple counts,85 are they then protected
by some generic soft-on-crime public sentimentality? It
appears not. Today’s U.S. culture is not soft on crime but hard
on crime. “Three strikes and you’re out” has been a steady
refrain in U.S. criminal law for a generation or more. 86 Tony
Hayward himself has predicted a punitive streak in U.S. law
because this is America, after all.87 We predict that the public
will expect the President to be tough on BP88 and that it should
be made to pay even if it goes bankrupt in the process.89
“Three strikes and you’re out” has particular irony when
applied to BP.90 The company has enjoyed the benefits of its
three strikes and is not yet out. Strike one was the so-called
Texas City disaster that killed fifteen workers (injured 170)
and earned record-setting penalties from the Occupational
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). 91 Strike two was
85. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 309(g)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(B) (2006) (a Class
II civil penalty may be assessed “per day for each day during which the violation
continues.”).
86. See Emily Bazelon, Arguing Three Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, § 6
(Magazine), at 40 (describing the case of Norman Williams, who was sentenced to life
in prison under California’s repeat-offender law for stealing a floor jack from a tow
truck).
87. BP CEO Predicts ‘Illegitimate’ Oil Lawsuit Because ‘This is America’, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/06/bp-ceopredicts-illegitim_n_566429.html.
88. See Stephanie Condon, Americans Don’t Care if BP Goes Bankrupt Paying for Oil
Spill, Poll Shows, CBS NEWS POLITICAL HOTSHEET (June 15, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20007755-503544.html
(reporting
that
seven out of ten Americans in the Gallup/USA Today poll say Mr. Obama has not been
tough enough on BP).
89. Id.
90. Jane F. Barrett, When Business Conduct Turns Violent: Bringing BP, Massey
and Other Scofflaws to Justice, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 287, 295-307 (2011) (indicating
BP has had six strikes and is still not out).
91. In 2007, BP pleaded guilty to a felony and paid a $50 million penalty for failing
to maintain equipment at a Texas City, Texas oil refinery and causing an explosion.
See United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
See also Texas City Refinery Explosion, Texas: Safety Failure on March 23, 2005, in
WHAT WENT WRONG: INVESTIGATING THE WORST MAN-MADE AND NATURAL DISASTERS
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the Greater Prudhoe Bay pipeline disaster that put sixty-three
workers at risk and earned huge penalties from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).92 Strike three is the
Gulf Oil Spill disaster, which killed eleven workers and
threatens to earn record-setting civil penalties under the
CWA.93 After the first two calamities, BP shuffled a few
administrators, handed down a few “be careful” directives, and
pursued a public relations binge to repair the company’s
reputation.94 As you well know, the Greater Prudhoe Bay
disaster unleashed a debarment proceeding before the EPA.95
That prospect was economically dangerous for the company
and our firm is surprised that BP survived that experience by
walking away with an ill-defined program for reform and a
mild admonition.96
The EPA’s surprisingly mild disposition was no doubt a
satisfactory outcome for your company and for the attorneys
who achieved this resolution. But we implore you not to rely on
past experience. BP has been lifted by the tides of tolerance
and the impulses of mercy. But never doubt that these
expressions of benign discretion can desert you quickly in the
204 (2011 Hearst Communications) (quoting the U.S. Chemical Safety & Hazard
Investigation Board “concluded that BP failed to heed or implement safety procedures
that had been recommended before the explosion.”).
92. BP pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor, paid a twelve million dollar fine, four
million dollars in restitution to the state of Alaska, and made a four million dollar
payment to a nonprofit wildlife fund. See Plea Agreement at 2, 16–18, United States v.
BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc., No. 3:07-cr-00125 (D. Alaska Oct. 25, 2007).
93. See Complaint, Center for Biological Diversity, Inc., v. BP America, Inc. et al.,
No. 2:10-cv-01768 (E.D. La. Jun. 18, 2010), reprinted in PHYLLIS SKUPIEN & RITA
CICERO EDS., 2010 GULF COAST OIL DISASTER: LITIGATION AND LIABILITY (Thomson
West 2010) [hereinafter 2010 GULF COAST OIL DISASTER]; see also Complaint of the
United States of America, United States v. BP Exploration and Production, Inc. et al.,
No.
2:10-cv-04536
(E.D.
La.
Dec.
12,
2010),
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/45341375 USA-Complaint-Against-BP-Et-Al.
94. The N.Y. TIMES reported on the latest breezes of reform that have swept the
decks of BP, but noted wryly that the man in charge of BP’s new safety division was
the same fellow who had detected conspicuous innocence in BP’s role in the
Transocean disaster. See Clifford Krauss & Julia Werdigier, BP’s New Chief, Not
Formally in the Role, Is Already Realigning Managers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/business/energy-environment/30safety.html.
95. See Lustgarten, supra note 5.
96. Id. (According to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Senior Attorney
Jeanne Pascal, by 2009 EPA’s demands included extra regulations and oversight of BP
operations not just in Texas and Alaska, but also in the Gulf. EPA also insisted that
the company move the Health, Safety and Environmental director back up the chain of
command to a Vice President position).
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corridors of the U.S. government.
In the end, we believe, BP’s best defense against criminal
charges and debarment is not its long record but its large size.
The “too big to fail” argument has worked on Wall Street to
defeat the draconian remedies of “debarment.”97 Prior to the
Gulf Oil Spill, the Greater Prudhoe Bay pipeline disaster
inspired debarment proceedings, but the Pentagon stepped in
and objected as BP was the largest supplier of oil.98 In a much
quieter fashion, corporate defense attorneys have invented a
comparable concept “too big to prosecute,” which is an
excellent description of the defense we intend to develop.
Fortunately, our firm has considerable experience with these
transactions that are called “deferred prosecution agreements.”
These agreements work as follows:
If companies pay the fine set by the prosecutor and
submit to probationary terms for good behavior,
perhaps an outside monitor, then government will defer
prosecution indefinitely or even drop it entirely. The
corporation thus avoids the stigma of a criminal trial
and the bad headlines that depress stock prices.99
The government needs its offshore oil revenues now more
than ever. To this end, the DOJ has little incentive to force BP
to the mat, whether in the name of “Old Testament Justice”
under the criminal laws or regulatory honor under the civil
laws. The government’s financial realities afford a partial
explanation as to why the DOJ previously succumbed so easily
to the path of “deferred prosecution.”100
97. Compare ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2008 Princeton U. Press)
with Federal Contractor Misconduct: Failures of the Suspension and Debarment
System, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT, May 10, 2002, available at
http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/contract-oversight/federal-contractormisconduct/co-fcm-20020510.html (finding that, since 1990, forty-three of the
government’s top contractors paid approximately $3.4 billion in fines/penalties,
restitution, and settlements and four of the top ten government contractors have at
least two criminal convictions. Only one of the top forty-three contractors has been
suspended or debarred from doing business with the government, and then, for only
five days).
98. Ron Nixon, Size Protects Government Contractors That Stray, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/us/politics/18contractor.html?scp=1&s
q=%22Size%20Protects%20Government%20Contractors%20That%20Stray%22&st=cs.
99. William Greider, How Wall Street Crooks Get Out of Jail Free, THE NATION (Mar.
23, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/159433/how-wall-street-crooks-get-out-jailfree?page=0,0.
100. See Press Release, BP America Inc., BP America announces resolution of Texas
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Like many attorneys, while we are comfortable arguing
what is right, we are most confident in being able to rest upon
precedent. We like the precedent of the “deferred prosecution
agreement.”101 We also can benefit from the lenient treatment
of past oil spillers. The convenient truth is that robust
environmental laws and vigorous prosecutors likely will not
suffice to bring criminal enforcement to the doorsteps of BP.
The best preview of the matter is the resolution of the Exxon
Valdez liabilities. In that case, Exxon Shipping pled guilty to
three misdemeanors and agreed to pay a fine of $150
million.102 Of this fine, $125 million vanished and was
“remitted” (“to forgive or pardon”) to the company because it
had behaved so nobly in agreeing to pay private claims and
cleaning up the spill.103 Another $100 million that might have
been collected for the taxpayers was declared “restitution” and
went to federal and state governments as might be done in the
case of stolen automobiles.104 The sole function of the “crime”
in the Exxon case was to keep ongoing settlement discussion of
civil damages and natural resource damages on a productive
note. There is no evidence in the Exxon context of toughminded prosecutors seeking retribution and holding corporate
offenders accountable. The only crime that received legal
notice was that of the bedraggled scapegoat for the whole
affair, Capt. Joseph Hazelwood.105 Liability never reached
Exxon “onshore.”
The U.S. Supreme Court has also been helpful to BP’s legal
defense. The Court’s decision in Exxon Shipping v. Baker left
open the question of whether a ship owner can be liable under

City, Alaska, propane trading, law enforcement investigations (Oct. 25, 2007),
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7037819.
101. Id.
102. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Punitive Decisionmaking, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 89,
93 (2009) (explaining that on October 9, 1991 the United States Government and State
of Alaska settled their claims against Exxon Shipping Company and Exxon
Corporation. Exxon pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor counts, including violations
of the Migratory Bird Act, the Clean Water Act and the Refuse Act. The plea
agreement resulted in a criminal fine of $150 million, with $125 million forgiven).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Hazelwood v. State of Alaska, 962 P.2d 196, 197–98 (1998); see also 2009
PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 279–82 (Joe Hazelwood, Captain of the Exxon
Valdez was acquitted of three of four charges, convicted of one misdemeanor;
sentenced to $50,000 fine and 1000 hours of community service).
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maritime law for punitive damages without “acquiescence in
the actions causing harm.”106 The court was divided four to
four on this matter of “derivative” liability107 and no one doubts
that the missing vote (Justice Alito) would have favored the
“corporate” view.
Exxon Shipping should be applied to limit liability on both
the civil and criminal fronts. If Exxon cannot be held liable
without explicit “acquiescence” in the misdeeds of Captain
Hazelwood, then BP should have clear sailing under both civil
and criminal law absent proof of an explicit directive from top
management to cut corners. Our overall strategy, as it was in
Exxon Shipping,108 is to confine liabilities to the management
and crew on the vessel itself. To this end, our firm needs every
shred of evidence (e.g. directives, manuals, announcements, or
instructions) given to your employees and your contractors
urging them to “follow the rules,” “put safety first,” or “take
pride in the job.”
BP should be aware that the stronger the preachment, the
greater the distance between liability derived from the scene of
the accident and liability derived from a corporate
relationship. The Supreme Court has shown itself to be
vulnerable to assurances of worthy environmental intent109
and we hope to give them assurances galore.
We advise BP to take advantage of two defensive tactics on
the criminal front. First, you must implicate others partially
responsible for the spill in all versions of this mishap. The
“others” should include the U.S. government, the company’s
employees and its contractors. Some might call this “finger
pointing” or “scapegoating,” but our firm views the tactic as a
just and appropriate allocation of responsibility. It is quite
possible, for example, that Transocean failed to prevent the
blast and that Halliburton was responsible for errors in the
cement job and testing that allowed the explosive natural gas
106. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S., 556 U.S. 599, 129 S.Ct. 1870,
1873, 1875–76, 1880 (2009) (8-1 decision) (holding that Shell Oil did not “arrange” for
the disposal of hazardous substances because it did not intentionally pollute the
groundwater at a chemical distribution business though it dictated the transfer
arrangements, knew of the spills, and provided advice and supervision; Shell had a
convincing campaign of preachment, instructions, and advice to avoid the pollution its
behavior virtually guaranteed).
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to seep into the well.110
Our strategy is to rerun the legal trajectory of the Exxon
case and have the “buck” stop with Hazelwood. We do not yet
know who the “Hazelwood” is in our case, but we implore BP to
help us identify this man and bring him to justice.111
Remember, Exxon took unilateral punitive action against
Hazelwood (he eventually was fired for violation of company
rules)112 and Exxon executives succeeded in shielding
themselves.
Second, in each and every step of the cleanup, BP should
collect and hide behind “permissions” granted by the United
States. In the early stages of the accident-to-be, BP “onshore”
brought the United States into the liability picture with a
telephone inquiry to MMS to secure a “waiver” in regard to a
revision in well cementing practices.113 We advise you to repeat
this move because it will dilute BP’s responsibility.
What does one expect of the criminal law and BP? Guilty
pleas on a half-dozen criminal charges that manifest our social
commitment to human life, wildlife and our environment? A
billion-dollar fine for the BP? Jail time totaling 100–200 years
for ten different “responsible corporate officers?” This would be
110. Krauss & Werdigier, supra note 94.
111. See ROWAN JACOBSEN, SHADOWS ON THE GULF: A JOURNEY THROUGH OUR LAST
GREAT WETLANDS 60–66 (Bloomsbury USA 2011) (on the roles of BP well site leaders,
Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine). We recognize the evidentiary value of the two witnesses
in the lifeboat who overheard Jimmy Harrell on his phone telling Houston, “I told you
this was gonna happen.” Id. at 65–66. Our problem with this evidence is that if
liability moves “to somebody in Houston,” it has moved to BP onshore. Again, our goal
is to confine the scapegoats to the vessel. See Editorial, Industry Doesn’t Step Up, N.Y.
TIMES (May 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/opinion/12wed1.html (“Who
is to blame for last month’s catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico? The other guy.
At least that’s what three oil executives, predictably and cynically, told a Senate
hearing on Tuesday.”).
112. See 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 279–81; see also JOHN KONRAD &
TOM SHRODER, FIRE ON THE HORIZON: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE GULF OIL DISASTER
261 (2011 Harper Collins) (Transocean survivor, Buddy Trahan stated that the “crew
and equipment were not at fault” and that “it was a “screwed-up plan.” The sister of
one of the victims “felt rage at the accusations against the drill crew” and felt that the
193-page BP report “that parceled out blame among “multiple companies and work
teams” meant. . . that the drill floor crew . . . was being saddled with ultimate
responsibility. . . . “How can somebody sit there and blame the victims when they’re
not here to defend themselves?”).
113. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 126–27 (approval of BP
request to set the temporary abandonment plug 3,300 feet below the mudline, a
departure from the usual 1,000 feet, approved by telephone in less than ninety
minutes).
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our “worst case” scenario. But we are confident that very little
of this will happen. One or two underlings, as Joseph
Hazelwood learned, should take the fall for the unfortunate
deaths at the Deepwater Horizon. BP will be asked to sign a
“deferred prosecution agreement.” Debarment will not happen.
Heads will not roll on this occasion.
B.

Civil Penalties

The prospect of civil penalties is more than meets the eye.
Section 309(d) of the CWA, which applies to fundamental
offenses such as discharging a “pollutant” without a permit,
states that “any person who violates [the CWA] . . . shall be
subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day
(adjusted to $37,500)114 for each violation.”115 It would appear
firmly within the realm of possibility that there is but a single
violation in this matter—the Macondo well blowout—albeit
with ongoing effects, and thus, we could defend against
charges of violating Section 301(a)116 of the CWA by claiming
that any penalties are capped at $25,000 (adjusted to $37,500)
per day.117 This would be a trivial toll for a company the size of
BP.
Unfortunately, Section 311 of the CWA opens the door to
liability that is far more economically dangerous to BP. In
addition to discharging “pollutants” into the Gulf of Mexico
without a permit, we will need to defend BP against violations
of Section 311(b)(3) of the CWA.118 This subsection prohibits
the “discharge of oil or hazardous substances” into a variety of
waters that include “activities under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act” in amounts that are “harmful” or in ways
that “may affect natural resources belonging to the United

114. See EPA Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties for Inflation, 40 C.F.R. § 19.4
(2009) (adjusting the statutory penalty found in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) from $25,000 per
day to $37,500 per day).
115. Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2006). BP is the “operator” of the
oil rig and thus would be responsible for the discharge of pollutants from a point
source.
116. Our firm will argue that the spill constitutes just one discharge under the CWA.
See 33 U.S.C. 1311(a).
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) (2006) (setting civil penalties for per day
violations of the CWA at $25,000); 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (2011) (adjusting penalties to
$37,000 after January 12, 2009).
118. 33 U.S.C. § 311(b)(3).
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States.”119 Try as we might, and conceding the clumsy wording
of Section 311, we do not see a way to defend BP against
violations of this statute.
Ineluctably, then, one is drawn to the civil penalty
provisions of Section 311(b)(7)(A), which state that a person
who is an operator of an “offshore facility” from which oil is
discharged “shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount up
to $25,000 (adjusted to $37,500)120 per day of violation or an
amount of up to $1,000 (adjusted to $1,100)121 per barrel of oil .
. . discharged.”122 If the federal government can prove “gross
negligence or willful misconduct,” a legal prospect that appears
quite plausible at this moment, the financial tally rises to a
civil penalty “of not less than $100,000 (adjusted to
$140,000),123 and not more than $3,000 (adjusted to $4,300)124
per barrel of oil . . . discharged.”125 The first formulation (using
the disjunctive either/or) affords us room to argue that a
$37,500 per day penalty should suffice to send any message
that needs to be sent. Considering the severity of the spill, the
second formulation, $140,000 and a per barrel charge of
$4,300, is a conceivable legal nightmare that could attend a
finding of “gross negligence or willful misconduct.”126
The following factors must be considered when the court
determines the amount of a civil judicial penalty: the
seriousness of the violation or violations; the economic benefit
to the violator, if any, resulting from the violation; the degree
of culpability involved; any other penalty for the same
incident; any history of prior violations; the nature, extent, and
degree of success of any efforts of the violator to minimize or
mitigate the effects of the discharge; the economic impact of
the penalty on the violator; and any other matters as justice
may require.127 None of these factors clearly support BP’s
defense. To aid the court’s considerations, nonetheless, our
119. Id.
120. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (adjusting penalties found in Clean Water Act § 311(b)(7)(A)).
121. Id.
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) (emphasis added).
123. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4 (adjusting penalties found in Clean Water Act § 311(b)(7)(D)).
124. Id.
125. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(D) (relating to proof of gross negligence and willful
misconduct).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 1321(b)(8).
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firm will argue against the seriousness of the violation and
that neither “negligence” nor “misconduct” occurred. We will
further contend that the civil penalties, like any criminal
charges, are a measure of vindictive “piling on,” allowing the
United States to recover three times for the same
disaster⎯once for the cleanup, again for the criminal law and
yet again for the civil penalties.
Two features of this environmental law of civil penalties
could significantly increase BP’s fine. The first is the barrel-bybarrel sum found in Subsection 311(b)(7)(A) of the CWA. The
quantitative precision of this numerical device cannot help but
give confidence to government negotiators who only can be
emboldened when it comes time to “make a deal.” We prefer to
frame the company negotiations, and draw on client-specific
needs, without a discordant dollars-per-barrel tune playing in
the background.
Second, enforcement of the environmental laws, including
the CWA, can be initiated by citizens.128 The CWA authorizes
citizens to bring suit for civil penalties or enforce compliance
with effluent standards issued by the EPA Administrator or a
state. These citizens can bring to the table time-tested and
experienced attorneys. In this matter, we fully expect a citizen
suit to be filed and we anticipate that it will seek a
“calculation” of civil penalties under that dollars-per-barrel
formula.129 As a result, BP may hear more than it wishes about
“doing the math” which can drive civil penalties into the
billions.130
Fortunately for BP’s defense, the U.S. Supreme Court has
provided ample advantages for defendants to resist citizen
suits,131 and we will spare no energy in seeking to curtail this
128. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER, Vol. 2 § 4.5
(West 1986) (with semi-annual updates). The danger of these sorts of lawsuits is
illustrated by Meister v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 623 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 2010).
129. Complaint, Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP America, Inc., No.
10CV01768 (E.D. La. June 18, 2010) reprinted in 2010 GULF COAST OIL DISASTER,
supra note 93.
130. Can
BP
Ever
Get
It
Right?,
N.Y. TIMES
(June
8,
2010)
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/opinion /08tue3.html (“do the math”). See also
Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill is the Largest of its Kind, Scientists
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html
(discussing the magnitude of the Gulf Spill).
131. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Environmental Laws of the 1970s: They
Looked Good on Paper, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 33–35 (2010) (discussing standing,
ripeness, notice, not continuing, and counsel fees as bars or deterrents to citizen suits).
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symbolic feature of U.S. environmental law. Generally, the
strategies we expect to pursue are to win the support of the
U.S. government and to enlist the defenses, provided by
Supreme Court decisions, to deprive the citizens of a
meaningful forum to seek relief.132 We also expect to establish
that, under Section 311 of the CWA, the prohibitions on oil
discharges are not enforceable by citizen suit.133
Right now, we are confident in defending the initial estimate
of 5,000 gallons per day that you provided our law firm and are
not displeased that considerable uncertainty surrounds this
figure.134 If this figure grows over time,135 however, our anxiety
will grow with it. We hope we have said enough on this topic of
civil penalties to convince you of the considerable value of not
knowing and never knowing the actual amount of oil spilled
from the Macondo Well. As your advocates, we are in the
curious position of advising you that the higher the volume of
this spill, the steeper the penalty you will pay.
We recommend that you quickly implement three policies to
mitigate the impact of high civil penalties. First, the company’s
132. See id.
133. See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 792 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. La.,
2011) (dismissing CWA suit claims on multiple grounds including standing, mootness,
and the holding in Gwaltney).
134. Compare FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 12–13 (initial estimates
were 2% of actual volume; 5000 barrels per day); Justin Gillis & Henry Fountain, Rate
of Oil Leak, Still Not Clear, Puts Doubt on BP, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/us/08flow.html; Day 48: The Latest on the Oil
Spill, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/science/earth
/08latest.html (“The amount of oil being collected as a result of a containment cap
placed on the ruptured well last week has increased and is now up to 11,000 barrels a
day. . . .”); with Justin Gills, Size of Spill Underestimated, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES
(May 13, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14oil.html (“There’s just no way
to measure it,” [statement of BP senior vice president Kent Wells]); RestoreTheGulf.
gov, United Command Continues to Respond to the Deepwater Horizon (Apr. 25, 2010),
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/04/25/update-8-unified-commandcontinues-respond-deepwater-horizon; Tim Dickinson, The Spill, the Scandal, and the
President, ROLLING STONE (June 8, 2010), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/
the-spill-the-scandal-and-the-president-20100608.
135. It does:
We’re all much too familiar with the aftermath. The Coast Guard’s initial claims
that the leaking oil was merely what was stored on the rig. Then the “discovery”
that 1,000 barrels per day were leaking. (A “game changer,” the Coast Guard
called it.) Then BP’s denial that 5,000 barrels per day were flowing. Then the
poignant absurdity of BP clinging to the 5,000-barrels-per-day estimate while it
was capturing around 15,000 barrels per day through a tube—and barely making
a dent in the flow.
See JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at 66–67.
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immediate use of dispersants, quickly, massively, and at depth
was—and is—a stroke of genius. The National Research
Council made clear years ago that dispersants function to
redistribute spilled oil on a zero-sum basis.136 That is, it is
possible to keep oil off the surface and out of the wetlands by
sinking it to depths. We point out that, fortuitously perhaps,
oil off the surface and out of sight might not be incorporated
into the calculation of BP’s liability.
Second, the civil penalties you will pay are likely to be
linked not to the amount that will be spilled, but to estimates
of that amount from the government, your company, or other
sources. To this end, it would be within your obvious interest
to stop the flow and to curtail it if it cannot be stopped. The
less obvious strategy is for you to explore, investigate and
develop methodologies for estimating the amounts of oil lost at
Macondo. In this context, doubt (and perhaps its close cousins,
controversy, uncertainty, and opinion) can be serviceable.137
Third, if the clock keeps ticking and the spill remains
unabated, BP may have nothing to gain from controlled,
scientifically reliable measures of the flow. A successful
capping of the well could afford an opportunity to measure the
flow as final preparations are made.138 Please understand that
a measurement such as this could be a disservice to BP’s
overall defense. If, in the end, there remains considerable

136. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, UNDERSTANDING OIL SPILL DISPERSANTS:
EFFICACY AND EFFECTS, Executive Summary at 2, 10 (2005), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11283.html (describing dispersants as chemical mixtures
sprayed onto a spill (usually from aircraft) to disperse the oil in the water column, thus
keeping it off surface waters and beaches). See also 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra
note 9, at 54.
137. Compare SAFINA, supra note 18, at 92 (BP spokesman stated “We are focused
on stopping the leak and not measuring it.”) with THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E.
WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH
RESEARCH 97-127 (2008) (on hiding science and strategies of deliberate ignorance).
138. Discussing the decision-making process that kept the well shut:
BP shut the stack and began the well integrity test at about 2:25 pm on July 15.
For the first time in 87 days, no oil flowed into the Gulf of Mexico. . . . Later that
afternoon, the science advisors, including McNutt and Hunter, met with
Secretaries Salazar and Chu to determine whether to keep the well shut in. Based
on the early pressure data, the group appears to have been firmly in favor of
reopening the well [thus presenting an occasion to measure the flow]. Garwin, who
had opposed even undertaking the well integrity test, voiced the strongest opinion,
arguing BP ought to stop the test immediately and wondering whether it was
already too late. No one at the meeting appears to have argued in favor of keeping
the well closed.
2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 165 (footnotes omitted).
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uncertainty about the rate and amount of the flow, we are
confident that a company with the size of BP might get the
benefit of the doubt from one or another federal agency.139
If this citizen suit for civil penalties proceeds against you as
we expect it to, we are ready to undermine it with a barrage of
motions and technicalities that the U.S. Supreme Court has
provided over the years. First, no matter how the suit is
framed or who the plaintiff is, we will argue that notice is
inadequate. The 1989 Supreme Court decision in Hallstrom v.
Tillamook County has evolved into the requirement that notice
is jurisdictional, and courts have insisted upon a precision of
notice that is not easily satisfied.140 (Thankfully, no one has
seemed to notice a later case in which the Court distinguished
the ongoing violation requirement of citizen suit provisions as
not jurisdictional.).141 We will further argue that citizens lack
standing to bring the suit. The Supreme Court has said that
standing is “jurisdictional” and a constitutional necessity142
and many courts have argued that environmental plaintiffs
cannot show injury.143 In every case, we will argue that the
citizen suit is foreclosed by “diligent” action by the
government.144
BP might further lobby the United States to bring a more
realistic and responsible civil penalty action to foreclose
139. See Robert L. Cavnar, BP Wins: EPA Will Agree to Cut Oil Spill Estimate,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-lcavnar/bp-wins-epa-will-agree-to_b_817327.html.
140. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20 (1989); see also:
Although the Hallstrom decision came down firmly on the side of holding that
notice is an absolute precondition to commencement of a citizen suit, the Court
carefully, and explicitly, stopped short of holding that the notice requirement ‘is
jurisdictional in the strict sense of the term.’ Nevertheless, courts applying
Hallstrom frequently characterize the notice requirement as a jurisdictional
requirement, and many cite Hallstrom specifically for this proposition, despite the
reservation in the Court’s Hallstrom decision.
Karl S. Coplan, Is Citizen Suit Notice Jurisdictional and Why Does It Matter?, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 49, 49
(2003).
141. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 92–93 (1998). See also
Coplan, supra note 140, at 49.
142. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
143. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 84–85
n.19 (1986 & Supp. 2010) (collecting “no injury” and other standing cases).
144. Our experience is that the statutory term “diligently prosecuting” found in 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2006) can be satisfied by the most pedestrian, knee-jerk, and
wanton actions, so long as there is something that looks like a “decision to enforce” by
the U.S. or a state.
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environmental plaintiffs (such as the Center for Biological
Diversity) who argue that civil penalties should approach the
statutory maxima prescribed by law.145 Further, we should
seek to recover our counsel fees from the environmental
plaintiff who started the suit in the first place.146 Finally, as
soon as the company stops the flow (or perhaps curtails it
substantially), we will move to dismiss any CWA citizen
suits.147 The Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction for
citizen suits exists only so long as the action complained of,
here the flow of oil, continues.148 A strange rule—but we are
happy to support its enforcement.
BP civil penalties are likely to land where the United States
says they should land—at one billion dollars. All contingencies
on this front commend a policy of remaining on good terms
with the United States. It is to our advantage that the
adversary we most respect—the Center for Biological
Diversity—is pursuing you not in the fertile fields of California
but in the bogged-down swamp of multi-district litigation in
Louisiana.149
C.

Potential Civil Damages

We are concerned about BP’s civil liability to injured
individuals and businesses as a result of the spill. The civil
liabilities of Exxon landed at approximately one billion dollars
for its 1989 spill.150 The liabilities for Saddam Hussein’s
destructive ruination of the Kuwaiti oil fields at the end of the
Gulf War in 1991 have run past five billion dollars.151 BP’s
145. 2010 GULF COAST OIL DISASTER, supra note 93, at 341.
146. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) allows an award of attorney fees “to any prevailing or
substantially prevailing party” if such an award is deemed “appropriate.” Several
successful defendants have recovered attorney fees. See Save Our Springs Alliance,
Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs, 304 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App. 2009) (assessing the
protectors of Edwards Aquifer $86,200 for their trouble).
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
148. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49
(1987). Following cessation of the leak, Judge Barbier dismissed CWA citizens’ suit
claims under Gwaltney because the Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction for
Clean Water Act suits when there were no ongoing violations. See In re Oil Spill by Oil
Rig Deepwater Horizon, 792 F. Supp. 2d 926, 932 (E.D. La., 2011).
149. See generally In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 792 F. Supp. 2d 926.
(dismissing citizen suit Master Complaint in its entirety).
150. See Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 471 (2008).
151. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, DANIEL BARSTOW
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near-certain liabilities are potentially many times that
amount, given the economic configuration of the Gulf, as
fisheries are closed, lay-offs ensue and businesses hunker
down. BP must think in terms of thirty to forty billion dollars
in liability.
Fortunately, U.S. tort law has been infiltrated in recent
years by various “alternative dispute mechanisms.”152 These
are customarily justified as beneficial improvements in
efficiency and fairness in the delivery of compensation to
victims.153 Perhaps they are. But compared to what? The
present system, of course: courts; juries; agencies; and lawyers.
Frankly, BP wants no part of this scene, populated as it is
with fervent and able class action lawyers who are
indefatigable investigators154 and fearless federal judges
brimming with compassion and confidence.155 BP has no
interest whatsoever in meeting an oil-spill jury in Louisiana,
Mississippi, or Texas, recalling perhaps that the Exxon Valdez
jury rang up a five billion dollar punitive damage award on
Exxon. To be sure, the Supreme Court bailed Exxon out of its
immediate punitive damage woes. The only consolation for BP
is that its punitive-damages will be “limited” to whatever large
sum the company is obliged to pay out in compensatory
payments.
On this civil liability front, BP is already on the defensive as
the lawsuits pour in. Tort lawyers are rounding up their
clients, courts are clearing their dockets and Attorneys
General are preparing suits against BP. We will work first and
foremost to “contain” this flood of litigation with the same
MACGRAW, A. DAN TARLOCK, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 728 n.2
(2d ed. 2007). By the way, we are hoping against hope that BP acts so that this oil spill
is stopped short of the records set by Saddam Hussein. Your attorneys cringe at the
prospects of a “worse than Saddam” publicity campaign launched against BP. See
FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 13 (in the end, “Saddam Hussein had
managed to spill more than escaped from Macondo, but that wasn’t easy”). Of course,
Saddam was trying to spill the oil while BP is trying to stop it.
152. See Julia Ann Gold, ADR Through a Cultural Lens: How Cultural Values Shape
Our Disputing Process, 2 J. DISP. RES. 289 (2005).
153. See generally id.
154. See, e.g., Geov Parrish, Brad Marten and Billy Plauche Tackle the Gulf Oil
Crisis—From Seattle, SUPER LAWYERS (July 2011), http://www.superlawyers.com
/washington/article/Battle-in-the-Bayou/659e064d-fb8d-4a18-b170-1952d0167dfd.html;
Scott Summy, Esq., Baron & Budd in 2010 GULF COAST OIL DISASTER, supra note 93.
155. For one among many profiles in judicial courage, see Aquifer Guardians in
Urban Areas v. Federal Highway Admin., 779 F.Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Tex. 2011).
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determination that the Corps of Engineers displays in dealing
with record-high waters on the Mississippi.
Accordingly, on the matter of civil liability, we recommend a
“breakout strategy,” something never tried before.156 We
recommend BP seek a meeting with the U.S. Attorney General,
and hopefully the President. BP will pledge to establish,
immediately and “without restriction,” a twenty billion dollar
compensation fund to pay the accumulating claims. At this
private meeting, all BP executives must demonstrate complete
and unqualified remorse for the accident. Your company must
pledge to set things right, to honor your commitments and to
pay all legitimate claims.157 BP must leave the distinct
impression that no child goes hungry, no widow aggrieved, no
business disadvantaged and no fisherman uncompensated.
We advise BP’s “first impression” meeting with the U.S.
President and the Attorney General to come off as a generous
display of corporate benevolence. BP may say that it is “on
probation,” or that the company’s Board of Directors is “eager
to make amends” and ready “to get on with the job of making
everybody whole in the Gulf.” Your hosts in the White House
will call this the “BP Oil Spill,” but we advise you to refer to it
as the Gulf Oil Spill. We do not believe it would be appropriate
at this first meeting to seek assurances (nor would they be
granted) that your generosity on this matter of compensation
be reciprocated on the topics of criminal law, civil penalties, or
natural resource damages. Should these subjects arise at the
meeting, you should say that BP wishes only to demonstrate
its good faith, to earn trust and respect and to prove that it
will be a reliable partner. We expect the federal government
will accept your generous offer.158 If accepted, the federal

156. See Zyg Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the
Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11041, 11045 (2010), available
at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol40/40.11041.pdf; Kristen Choo, The Price of Oil, 96Aug A.B.A. J. 34, 36 (2010), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article
/the_price_of_oil (finding that the agreement between President Obama and BP
Chairman Carl Henric-Svanburg is “unprecedented).
157. See Press Release, supra note 11.
158. The government’s Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund contains limited funds. See
2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 135 (explaining that the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund held only $18,600,000 on the day the rig exploded and
highlighting that by November 2010, BP had paid the federal government over $580
million in response costs).
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government is free to announce the agreement in any way it
chooses—hopefully through a Presidential Speech from the
Oval Office.159
What are we hoping to achieve with our stunning offer of a
“claims compensation arrangement?” We seek nothing less
than the displacement of the current public compensation
system based on legal and equitable theories with a private
one of our own making. We see the present legal system as
threatening to BP and advise the company to steer clear of the
present system.
The time is now for BP to suggest such a compensation
scheme, as U.S. tort law is vulnerable to this kind of wholesale
transformation. The breakout strategy we recommend is that
BP establishes its own compensation system capable of
affording a BP forum, process and law. Its essential features
are “independence,” private control, a capacity to say “no,” and
the backing of the U.S. government.
1.

Developing an Independent Compensation System

The requirement of an “independent” compensation system
is an implacable necessity to gain any semblance of public
acceptance. You must invent a compensation system that is
“independent” of any government or corporate entity and start
funneling your compensation efforts (apart from cleanup) to it.
We recommend that your corporation stop calling its payouts
“BP compensation” and start calling them compensation from
the Independent Gulf Claims Facility Process.160 BP must
convince the world that this process is “independent,”161
referring to the placement of space, distance, process and
organization between BP and the compensatory payouts. As an
“independent” compensation system, the administrator of the
system must not be subject to “official legal status or court
159. Statement by the President After Meeting with BP Executives, THE WHITE
HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (June 16, 2010, 2:25 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-after-meeting-withbp-executives.
160. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com (last
visited June 5, 2011).
161. Convincing the world is achieved by convincing oneself first. See generally
MICHAEL SHERMER, THE BELIEVING BRAIN: FROM GHOSTS AND GODS TO POLITICS AND
CONSPIRACIES—HOW WE CONSTRUCT BELIEFS AND REINFORCE THEM AS TRUTHS
(2011).
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imposed authority.”162 The compensation system is
“independent” because its administration is not beholden to BP
or the government, but only to the claimants.163 This myth of
“independence” 164 from legal or court-imposed authority is so
serviceable to our cause that BP should persist in that
characterization for as long as the courts allow.165
Ironically, your company’s criticism of its own compensation
process reinforces the perception that the system is
“independent.” To this end, you may criticize it for wasting BP
money, for squandering good will, for undermining public
confidence and for being hasty and imprudent in its accounting
practices.166 In a similar vein, it would not hurt BP if the
generous compensation scheme were to be denounced by some
established public figure as a “shakedown” by the U.S.
government.167 We believe this sub-theme of “coercion” and
“reluctant unwillingness to submit” by BP can serve our
interests in the longer haul. In response to charges of this ilk,
our firm recommends a company policy of “coy denial.” For
example, BP can discount critics as wrong, while pointing out
that most companies are slow to celebrate an unanticipated
expenditure of twenty billion dollars.

162. Moira Herbst, Pressure on Kenneth Feinberg to Disclose BP Pay Deal, REUTERS
(Nov. 23, 2010, 2:03 AM), http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/article/idINIndia53083520101122.
163. At a meeting with residents affected by the spill in Kenner, Louisiana, Kenneth
Feinberg said of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: “It is independent. It is not part of BP.
It is not part of the government. It is an independent program and I am beholden to
neither of them. I am working for you.” Lea Winerman, BP Set to Hand Over Control
of $20B Gulf Coast Oil Claims Fund, BPS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 20, 2010 4:07 PM),
http://www.BPs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/08/bp-to-hand-over-damage-claimsprocess-gulf-coast-claims-facility.html.
164. Gulf Coast Claims Facility Frequently Asked Questions, in 2010 GULF COAST
OIL DISASTER, supra note 93, at 291 (the GCCF is an “independent claims facility” and
the Claims Administrator “is an independent, neutral fund administrator”).
165. On February 2, 2011, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
ordered BP and its agents, including Kenneth Feinberg, to refrain from referring to
Feinberg as “ ‘neutral’ or ‘completely independent’ of BP.” See In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig
Deepwater Horizon, 792 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. La., 2011) (order granting in part a
motion to supervise ex parte communications with putative class).
166. See John Schwartz, BP Says Spill Settlement Terms Are Too Generous, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/us/18bp.html.
167. See Richard Adams, Joe Barton: The Republican Who Apologized to BP, THE
GUARDIAN (June 17, 2010, 6:12 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/richard-adamsblog/2010/jun/17/joe-barton-bp-apology-oil-spill-republican.
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Private Control of the Independent Claims Settlement
Process

The requirement that the compensation system be “private”
is indispensable to its success. Our firm recommends that you
hire a private law firm paid entirely by your company, charged
with the responsibility of designing and processing all spillrelated claims. This is a significant enterprise; we are
recommending displacing overnight substantial portions of
state legal systems with a privately administered
compensation system. Not all attorneys are suited for this job
and the choice must be carefully made.168 We must warn you
that each time the corporation chooses to exercise its
“ownership” of this “private” claims process there will be a
price exacted at the independence end of the spectrum. You are
free to compensate this law firm as you choose, but the myth of
independence will suffer a setback each time the public reads
the compensation of the claims manager is a private matter
between “me and BP.”169
That said, being “private” is the way this claims facility can
remain free of legal rigidity or court-imposed authority. It
must not be held back by the necessities of due process, notice
or public participation. Quite the contrary, the process BP is
inventing is filled with administrative black holes, expressed
as endless confusion over claim forms, representation of
claimants, referrals, fees, necessary documentation, waivers of
the right to sue, procedures and constantly changing avenues
of legitimacy.170 The claims website will be humming with new
168. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Master of Disasters: Is Ken Feinberg Changing the
Course of Mass Tort Resolution?, 97-Jan A.B.A. J. 32 (2011), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/master_of_disasters.
169. Mr. Feinberg stated at a news conference that his compensation was
“something between me and BP.” Frederic J. Frommer, Administrator Has to ‘Sell’ BP
Victims
on
Money,
MSNBC.COM
(July
19,
2010
1:53
PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38311190/ns/business-oil_and_energy/t/administratorhas-sell-bp-victims-money. See also John Schwartz, Comments by Overseer of BP Fund
Irk Lawyers, THE N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22
z/us/22feinberg.html (reporting that “Mr. Feinberg has repeatedly said that he is
acting independently of BP and the government, and he openly acknowledges that BP
is paying for his work—’who better?’ he says—saying taxpayers should not be footing
the bill.”).
170. See Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, Many Hit By Spill Now Feel Caught
in Claim Process, N.Y.TIMES (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/us
/19spill.html; see also Alfred R. Light, Protocols for the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: An
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business, but any change of direction is best justified by
reference to the “private nature” of the process.
BP has three immediate problems. First, it needs a favorable
forum. Second, it needs a favorable process for displacing
other, more dangerous forums. And, third, it needs a favorable
law that will work to minimize its liabilities.
We propose to solve all three of these problems for BP and
can recommend the best man for the job: Kenneth Feinberg.171
Feinberg is highly competent and anxious to undertake this
important public service for BP. He has overseen a number of
notable mediations and claim settlements in the past,
including serving as Special Master of the seven billion dollar
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund172 and serving as
Special Master in Agent Orange, asbestos personal injury,
wrongful death, Dalkon shield and DES (pregnancy
medication) cases. We have investigated the matter and
understand that you can hire Feinberg’s six-lawyer
Washington, D.C., firm, Feinberg Rozen, for a flat fee of
$850,000 per month for labor and overhead costs.173 That
would be thirty million dollars over a three-year period. The
average hourly rate, were the firm paid on an hourly basis,
would be about $1,000 per hour—quite reasonable in the
circumstances. Thus you can afford to pay this man what he
deserves and provide him with necessary support that befits a
“private” operation.174
Unlike the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund,

Etiquette of Equivocation, 25 TOXICS LAW RPTR. 985 (2010) (examining Draft Protocol
for GCFC released to state officials in July 201 and the Protocol for Emergency
Advance Payments released in August 2010 and finding that provisions are becoming
“less precise and more ambiguous”).
171. Kenneth Feinberg is the founder and managing partner of the alternative
dispute resolution firm Feinberg Rozen, LLP. He is the current administrator of the
Gulf Coast Claims Facility.
172. Working over a thirty-three-month period, Mr. Feinberg eventually convinced
97% of the eligible claimants to settle through the fund rather than file lawsuits. The
Price of Oil, supra note 156, at 40.
173. See Herbst, supra note 162 (citing a report commissioned by Mr. Feinberg and
created by former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, now a partner with Debevoise
& Plimpton, that released some details about Feinberg’s compensation).
174. “On July 15, 2010, Feinberg, flying on a private jet paid for by BP, toured
Louisiana and tried to assure affected residents they would be fairly compensated.”
Brian J. Donovan, Will Victims of the BP Oil Gusher Also Be Victims of Class Action
Lawsuits and the BP Oil Spill Victim Compensation Fund? (July 16, 2010),
http://donovanlawgroup.wordpress.com/2010/07/19/165.
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which was created by an Act of Congress and administered by
the DOJ, the BP fund our firm proposes is fundamentally a
“private” operation. It differs from trusts set up by companies
to compensate victims, such as those created by asbestos and
pharmaceutical companies, which have been overseen by
judges. As administrator of this hypothetical compensation
fund, Feinberg has told us that he would be operating under
“no official legal statute or court-imposed authority.”175 He is
free of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes (and its disclosure provisions) because he is not a
referee between adversaries. In other words, he would be a
private party asked by both sides to design and implement the
Gulf Coast Claims Facility on behalf of everyone involved.176
He will be weighing the merits of individual claims and thus
all BP fund claimants must trust the knowledge, experience,
and fairness of our man. We are especially drawn to the
“private party” pledge. This is a forum that could be tolerated
by BP.
Mr. Feinberg will define his own process, make up his own
law, and write his own rules. We are confident that the
compensation scheme proposed will be the most fair to BP.
The public posture of the “private” claims facility is
important because the claims facility will come under
sustained criticism. It must be alert to fraud and quick to
denounce it. Lists of proven cheaters could be sent to local
prosecutors, who are ever ready to capitalize on “easy cases”
with a high publicity value. The claims facility folks must be
insistent upon high standards of proof because, no doubt, many
deserving claimants will be turned away. The person who runs
this operation must be ready for the inevitable battles over the
private claims facility.177
175. Herbst, supra note 162.
176. Compare John Schwartz, Fund Official Not Neutral, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/us/03feinberg.html (reporting that
Judge Barbieri ordered Mr. Feinberg to make clear to potential litigants that he is
acting on behalf of BP) with Alfred R. Light, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust
and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: The “Superfund” Myth and the Law of Unintended
Consequences, 5 ENVTL. L. J. 87 (2011).
177. See generally John Schwartz, Man With $20 Billion to Disburse Finds No
Shortage
of
Claims
or
Critics,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
19,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/us/19feinberg.html (“In an interview, Mr.
Feinberg was undaunted. ‘I will not pay claims that can’t be proven, that lack proof,
that are not substantiated,’ he said. ‘I won’t do it!’”); Master of Disasters, supra note
168 (discussing Mr. Feinberg).
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3.

The Capacity to Say “No”

Like any legal arrangement, these three goals of ours, a BP
forum, a BP process, and a BP law, are interrelated. These
goals must function together to allow the BP claims
administrator to say “no,” and send any claim back to the
“black hole” (we prefer this characterization) of the
conventional compensation system. Our goal is to set up an
arrangement where we can pay the “easy” claims (at a
discount, of course) and deny the hard claims.
Strategically, in choosing its own law, BP will be able to
circumvent pockets of law invented to aid claimants in
recovery. For example, under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),
responsible parties like BP are liable for the removal costs and
damages that result from the incident.178 The OPA relaxes
proximate cause defenses for subsistence claims.179 Further,
responsible party (RP) compensatory payments do not preclude
additional recoveries under the generally available tort law.180
To this end, OPA is especially solicitous of “subsistence”
fishermen.181
This fine illustration of easier proof for subsistence claims
and larger recoveries for all claimants underscores why BP
must adopt a claims process empowered to say “No.” It is
possible that OPA’s version of “subsistence” does not exist
outside of Alaska, but we are reluctant to advance that legal
argument in the presence of thousands of people in the Gulf
who feel aggrieved because they have been deprived of their
livelihoods.182 We see no reason to be confrontational about a
matter that we can bury through more subtle legal defenses.
The BP claims administrator needs a universal, pedestrian
and familiar legal defense that allows the rejection of any and
all claims as a matter of discretion. This generic defense is
“proximate cause.” For example, damage from the spill to a
New York fish company untouched by the oil is “distant,
remote, and unforeseeable.” BP has done enormous damage
178. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
179. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(C).
180. See id. § 2718.
181. Id. § 2702(2)(A), (C).
182. See id. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (Damages “for loss of subsistence use of natural
resources” are recoverable by any “claimant” who so uses them); see also JACOBSEN ,
supra note 111, 10-20.
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throughout a highly integrated economy and thousands of
businesses (think Florida resorts, New Orleans shippers,
Chicago shrimp buyers) can prove this damage. The
independent claims administrator needs to lay the groundwork
for an assertion that the extent of BP’s responsibility for
potential claims can be reasonably curtailed by traditional
notions of “proximate cause.”
To develop this defense, we recommend BP hire a
“distinguished Harvard Professor” to prepare a report arguing
that “proximate cause” remains a viable defense even after the
1990 OPA. Thus the Harvard Law School will hand BP a
universal proximate cause defense that will enable BP to say
“no” for a substantial number of economic claimants whose
injury is not closely linked to the oil spill. Though it might
gloss over the distinctions we have mentioned between the
“subsistence” and the other economic claimants, the report will
merely confirm the state of the law.183
Despite these efforts, the “proximate cause” defense will not
adequately address “subsistence” claimants. These claims
must be defeated on alternative grounds. The economically
strong and well-recorded claims based on damage farther from
the spill must be denied on grounds of “proximate cause.” But
the subsistence people who are closer to the spill, with
sympathies working in their favor, must be denied on grounds
of “poor documentation.”184 This modest requirement of simple
records is an insurmountable mountain to people who keep no
records. A rule that paperwork be completed “in English”
sounds simple enough even though it might entail a platoon of
workers, helpers, law students or agents to meet the
requirement.
In fashioning the company rules for the claims facility, BP
should exclude attorneys in order to keep the process quick,
simple, efficient, cheap, and down to earth. Remember, the
alternative that BP is promising to avoid, and the one that

183. See generally Memorandum from John C. P. Goldberg, Professor at Harvard
Law School, to Kenneth Feinberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the
Deepwater
Horizon
Oil
Spill
(Nov.
22,
2010),
available
at
http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/Goldberg.Memorandum.of.Law.2010.pdf.
184. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, FINAL RULES GOVERNING PAYMENT OPTIONS,
ELIGIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIATION CRITERIA, AND FINAL PAYMENT METHODOLOGY 2
(2011),
available
at
http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/FINAL_RULES.pdf
(“Adequate documentation of damage attributable to the Oil Spill is required.”).
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rushes into the minds of all claimants, is the prolonged legal
disaster that befell the 32,000 plaintiffs in the Exxon case.185
Let the world believe that this drawn-out process is what
attorneys offer. Though, admittedly, Brian O’Neill and his
team did a brilliant job on behalf of the fishing-class plaintiffs
in Exxon,186 the general public does not necessarily see it this
way. The Exxon case ended badly for the fishermen and BP can
improve upon this outcome.
It will be indispensable for the Gulf Claims Facility to
develop, define, and enforce a complete system of “waivers”
and “releases” that will protect BP from additional and future
claims. Remember, the people you intend to pay have certain
entitlements, such as tort remedies above and beyond those
promised by the 1990 OPA,187 and those people must surrender
these rights “voluntarily” as a condition of accepting your
compensation.
This “waiver” conditioned upon releases of all present and
future claims represents the most effective way to implement a
company policy of “our way or the highway.” Some courts do
not like this coercive practice,188 but it was widely used by
Exxon in Alaska.189 The special magic in this waiver is that it
permits BP to exploit the very fear, frustration and economic
devastation that the oil spill has spawned. We will offer the
only way out for these claimants, money in the hand today; the
greater their need, the more willing they will be to take what
we offer and sell their future legal prospects.190 This tactic
enables BP to continue—and amplify—the campaigns it
conducted historically against trial lawyers, class actions, and

185. See generally 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9.
186. See generally DAVID LEBEDOFF, CLEANING UP: THE STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST
LEGAL BONANZA OF OUR TIME (1997).
187. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2718, 2751 (2006).
188. Alabamians Urged Not to Sign BP Waivers, OIL SPILL CLAIMS FUND (Aug. 8,
2010), http://oilspillclaimsfund.com/alabamians-urged-not-to-sign-bp-waivers.
189. See J. Steven Picou, When the Solution Becomes the Problem: The Impacts of
Adversarial Litigation on Survivors of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 68 (2009).
190. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Spill Damages, Phase Two, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14mon2.html; Richard Fausset & Louis
Sahagun, Gulf Oil Spill: One Year Later and Portraits From the Gulf, LOS ANGELES
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-oil-spillhtml,0,6578241.htmlstory (“The oil might not be as visible in the gulf, but the
residents are still coping with effects of the nation’s largest offshore oil spill.”).
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big government. Better yet, in this new light, Exxon’s twentyyear war of attrition against the Alaska fishermen is not only a
legal triumph for the oil industry—it is a threat and a promise
of what happens to those who choose an alternative legal
future to the one offered by your company’s “independent”
claims facility.
In this struggle for the loyalties of the oil spill victims, BP
will discover creative ways to undermine the credibility of trial
lawyers and others who are part of the “system” for helping
real victims in real time. To mention one wild example, we
fully expect one of your oil drilling partners—Transocean
perhaps—to file suit against the widows of the men killed in
the loss of the Macondo Well.191 This would be part of a legal
maneuver to limit liability under an archaic law. In its
magnanimity, BP wants no part of this kind of widowwitching. BP is free to cite the tactic as illustrative of why your
compensation system is superior to business as usual.
For an illustration of why the BP claims waivers must leave
nothing to future legal happenstance, consider Loretz v. Regal
Stone, Ltd.,192 a class action brought by Dungeness Crab
Skippers and Crew Members harmed by the COSCO BUSAN
oil spill. The accident occurred when the cargo ship collided
with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge on November 7,
2007. The case raised state law claims under the legal theories
of negligence, nuisance and strict liability. These claimants
had received over sixteen million dollars through the OPA
Claims Process.193 In Loretz, the court assessed additional
damages of $343,332.17, along with two attorneys’ fee awards
of $854,842.95 and $427,630. Your company must do all in its
power to avoid this kind of serial assessment.
Congress said these fishermen had these “extra” rights. BP
cannot affirmatively divest these people of their rights, but BP
can squeeze them into submission—to the point that these
rights are voluntarily surrendered. Persistent necessity will do
the legal job for us.
We are confident that the disaster BP created, and the
cascade of anxieties let loose by unpaid bills, lost jobs, and

191. Oil Spill Widow: Transocean
http://mag.ma/cnn/1291071.

is

192. 756 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
193. See id.

Suing

Me,

CNN

(Apr.

20,

2011),
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missing fish will drive these people to BP’s “independent”
claims facility. BP might wish to invent a system of “partial
payments,” which will increase dependency and raise hopes.
Additionally, BP should stay alert to moments of particular
urgency, such as holidays, which multiply the stresses of
closing opportunity. Throughout this process, BP will
consistently offer these people a financial “bird in the hand.”
The proverbial alternative, “the two in the bush,” is a distant
and terrifying option of another Exxon “crash.” Reasonable
people will choose the BP option, “independent” or not, because
it is the best one available.
When claimants sign their rights away, nobody will quibble
about the scope of the release. Our motto is “the broader, the
better.” We further recommend inclusion of a hidden clause in
the waiver form. If a claimant gives up the right to sue BP and
other responsible parties and pursues a settlement amount,
this claimant must sign off not only for him or herself, but for
“affiliates” as well. This broad waiver covertly would force the
individual to sign off for his or her spouse, parents and heirs.
For commercial claimants, this rule also applies; the
commercial claimants would be obliged to sign away the rights
of their partners, shareholders and others to sue.
Finally, our firm must emphasize that it is imperative for
BP to remain steadfast and firm in its administration of this
claims process. Wal-Mart did not become the largest
corporation in the world by readily paying off claimants.
Everybody remembers that Exxon “won” its oil spill case, but
few recall the fury with which it attacked that punitive
award.194 Your company’s actions will attract critics, but you
will have answers for them all.195
194. The Exxon Valdez Reopener, supra note 20, at 184 (Exxon filed “more than 60
petitions and appeals, sought 23 time extensions and filed more than 1,000 motions,
briefs, requests and demands” and claimed jury misconduct and jury tampering.).
195. See, e.g., Troy King Blasts Oil Spill Compensation Plan; Attorney General and
Surgeon
General
to
Visit,
Al.com
(July
14,
2010,
5:00
AM),
http://blog.al.com/live/2010/07/troy_king_blasts_oil_spill_com.html
(Troy
King,
Alabama Attorney General stating that the BP compensation fund was “collusive (with
BP) at best and contrary to the public interest at worst); BP Compensation Fund
Controversy Addressed by Motley Rice Attorney Don Migliori, MOTLEY RICE (September
13, 2010), http://www.motleyrice.com/news/view/bp-compensation-fund-controversyaddressed-by-motley-rice-attorney-don-migliori (“The special master is really there to
get claims paid for as little as possible as quickly as possible so that that liability goes
away.”); BP Claims Report, Gulf Coast Claims Facility Promises: A Timeline, http://bpclaims-report.com/gulf-coast-claims-facility (last visited Nov. 14, 2011); Rachel Slajda,
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The Backing of the U.S. Government

It is important to underscore our legal conviction that all
claims for “removal costs or damages shall be presented first to
the responsible party.”196 Shortly, the President will designate
BP a responsible party.197 Overall, it will be BP’s strategy to
pay or deny these claims as quickly and completely as possible.
It is important to secure—and maintain—U.S. support for our
claims process and its preclusive effects throughout.
We believe the time is ripe for a wholesale displacement of
public compensation measures with a “private” system, such as
the one we are proposing here. Fortuitously for BP, corporate
America long has been waging a war on the healthy features of
the U.S. justice system that BP is most anxious to avoid. It is
winning that war.198 Tort lawyers, and class actions in
particular, are a popular political target. BP should be most
happy to do its duty to take on this “litigation monster.”
The twenty billion dollar down payment should suffice to
cover these claims and allow you to prevent this process from
spinning out of control. You have a direct pipeline to your
“private” if not “independent” decision maker. If twenty billion
dollars is an “overpayment,” and if Mr. Feinberg wields his
“proximate cause” axe with sufficient enthusiasm, the
unclaimed funds of course will be returned to BP.
In sum, we believe that twenty billion dollars will cover your
civil liability. You can comfortably argue that the BP
compensation system is superior to any alternatives. If you
“underpay,” that is not BP’s problem. That is a problem for the
states or for the federal government. BP cannot be fairly
blamed for disadvantageous choices made by desperate people.
D.

Response Costs and the Cleanup
In 1990, post-Exxon Valdez, Congress thrust responsible

BP: Spill Claimants Can’t Sue Until They’re Denied by the Escrow Fund First, TPM
Muckraker (Sept. 14, 2010), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/09/bp_
spill_claimants_cant_sue_unless_theyre_denied_b.php (Kenneth Feinberg stating “If I
don’t find you eligible, no court will find you eligible.
196. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a) (2006).
197. Id. § 2714(a).
198. See e.g. AT&T v. Concepcion, ____ U.S. ____, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742
(2011) (allowing corporations to include in contracts with forced arbitration clauses
language forbidding people from taking part in class-action lawsuits).
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parties into a role of primary responsibility for the cleanup.199
Your company is now in that primary responsibility category
for the Gulf. Our firm believes, however, that this legal
“disadvantage” can serve BP purposes spectacularly by
providing autonomy over the events on the ground. Thus, our
firm urges you to assert immediate and sweeping authority at
the site so that no initiative starts, no policy happens, no rules
transpire, no press releases issue unless your company is the
initiating authority.
How can we dare to aspire to such a thing? The Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 (OPA)200 was the Congressional response to the
1989 Exxon Valdez spill and intended, in part, to extend the
relatively longstanding “Superfund Model,” with its command
structure and emergency response procedures, to the oil spill
context. Responsible Parties (RP) are liable for “removal costs
and damages” under OPA.201 In the Gulf, BP bears
responsibility for certain “removal costs” including “the costs
incurred” after a discharge of oil and any costs “to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate oil pollution” from the incident.202 The
geography of your company’s responsibility thus follows the oil
and expands accordingly. The site of your obligation is the
entire Gulf region impacted by the spill. The OPA imposes RP
liability on any person owning, operating or chartering a vessel
or facility that creates a spill, such as Deepwater Horizon.203
There are other RPs that will be exposed through this
litigation, but BP is in the point position, and you will see why
that is helpful.
1.

BP as Co-Operator of the Incident Command Post

RPs, under the National Contingency Plan (NCP), are
preferred by the federal government to handle and fund all
response activities while the Federal On-Scene Coordinator
simply directs or supervises.204 As an RP, according to the
Unified Command framework, BP not only has a foot in the
door at the Incident Command Post, but can promote and
199. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. § 2701(31).
203. Id. § 2701(32).
204. 40 CFR § 300.305(c) (2010).
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develop response actions virtually alongside the Federal OnScene Coordinator as part of the government’s Unified
Command. The Coast Guard established a Unified Area
Command⎯headquarters for the regional spill response⎯on
April 23 in Robert, Louisiana, and will likely move it to New
Orleans in the future. The Unified Area Command eventually
will include representatives from the federal government,
Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Texas and BP.
It was wise and commendable for BP to rush into their
position within the NCP to combat this spill. When the turmoil
is greatest, all are wondering, “Who’s in charge?” BP stepped
up to say: “We are,” combining words with actions. This fast
action, based on good legal advice and responsive
management, helped to save your company from a larger legal
disaster. The corporation should give bonuses to employees
who thought to anticipate the organizational ramping up of the
Coast Guard:
[On April 22, the day the rig sank] the Coast Guard had
established an Incident Command Post in a BP facility
in Houma, Louisiana. BP had formed a command post
in its corporate headquarters in Houston, Texas shortly
after the [April 21] explosion, and the Coast Guard
established an Incident Command Post there as well.205
Under OPA, we believe BP is a “co-owner,” “co-operator,”
and “co-combatant”206 in a joint enterprise to combat the oil
spill.
Further, the Superfund model that Congress incorporated
into the OPA will work to BP’s advantage by allowing BP to
take its own remedial actions and leave the larger mess to
future happenstance. Under the Superfund laws, many of the
RPs at various Superfund sites realized that it was virtually
impossible to defeat EPA’s 106 orders.207 Knowing this and
knowing that EPA could clean up the site itself and send the
bill to the RP, many RPs undertook to do their own
“remediation” action at their own pace, with their own
contractors and with their own perspectives on what was
necessary, under the watchful eye of EPA. These “voluntary”

205. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 130–31.
206. Id. at 124 (photo caption); see also id. at 133–35.
207. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2006).
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cleanups are conspicuous all over the United States, and are
typically undertaken by large companies who know that they
would be stuck with the costs in any event.
We advise BP, as a designated RP for the Gulf Oil Spill, to
take over and manage the entire Gulf response action to the
greatest extent allowed by the on-scene coordinator. This is a
bold and sweeping initiative, but it is the best path for
restricting and containing BP’s liabilities. We are confident
that, together, BP and our legal team can pull it off. It is likely
that this strategy will attract many critics,208 but we have a
ready answer: the law requires it. OPA RP liability requires it.
The law, in our experience, is a wonderful scapegoat and
absorbs never-ending criticism without comment or objection.
From this day forward, there is one and only one answer to a
question you will often hear: “Who put BP in charge?” Your
answer: “The law.”209
The United States, particularly the Coast Guard, must be
quickly incorporated into our scheme. The NCP fully
anticipates arrangements where the federal on-scene
coordinator supervises response activities while the RP carries
out the duties and pays the bills. The Coast Guard always has
the option to “federalize” the Spill, paying for the response
with funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, and later
seeking reimbursement from the RP.210 We do not want this to
happen, and fortunately, neither does the Coast Guard. The
Trust Fund is far from sufficient,211 and the Coast Guard is
208. Compare SAFINA, supra note 18, at 53 (“We don’t normally put the criminal in
charge of the crime scene.”) with id. at 54 (“the government keeps deferring to BP”),
and id. at 128 (“BP is obviously a company with a lot to hide. But how it’s staged a
coup of the Gulf and gained control of government—that, I don’t get. . . . why are any of
our law enforcers, who should be guarding the coast against BP, so thoroughly and
sickeningly capitulating, deferring, and letting themselves Be Played?”) (emphasis in
original). See also Peter Baker, Obama Gives a Bipartisan Commission Six Months to
Revise
Drilling
Rules,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
23,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/7s/23address.html (“At his daily briefing on
Friday, Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary explained repeatedly that
current law makes the company responsible for the recovery and cleanup, not
taxpayers.”).
209. See SAFINA, supra note 18, at 278–80 (quoting Admiral Thad Allen, “That was
what the law required.”).
210. 40 CFR § 300.305(d) (2010).
211. Compare 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 135 (MMS had
a “lack of resources”), with id. at 135 (the “emergency reserve” available to the federal
on-scene coordinator the day the rig exploded was $18,600,000. By Nov. 11, BP had
paid $580, 977,461 to the federal government for response costs.).
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unprepared in other ways for the enormous bureaucratic
exertion a response of this size would entail.212
This “co-combatant” outcome places BP exactly where it
wants to be, and again the Exxon model commends itself. In
any “partnership,” the more aggressive of the two gets to lead.
BP must aspire to influence, and if possible, to dominate, each
and every aspect of the response: from the definition, release
and control of information; to the choice, order and
configuration of technology to stop the spill; and to the
recruitment, gearing-up, priorities, and assignments of
cleanup crews. BP must be in charge in every sense of the
word. This way, BP can define, contain, and limit this oil spill
by devoting its full economic strengths to three overarching
goals: (1) defining the spill as a “mishap;” (2) defining its
containment as “progress” and (3) defining the cleanup as
“proceeding according to schedule.” If BP follows our firm’s
advice by focusing its message and implementing policies
aggressively and consistently, the law will shift to
accommodate these policies.
In confidence, of course, while our firm believes
characterizing BP as “in charge” and the “dominant partner” is
correct and appropriate, we recommend that BP’s policy,
beginning immediately, should be to use precise terminology
when referring to the U.S. government and each of its
agencies. These government actors are “partners,” “members of
the same team,” or “co-leaders” of this enterprise. It is our
firm’s hope that from this afternoon forward, all of BP’s major
oil spill response policy decisions will enjoy, at least arguably,
the “concurrence” of the U.S. government. This federal
concurrence is important because BP must make as many
friends as possible within the ranks of U.S. government
agencies to ensure the company’s survival and prosperity.
Praise, compliments, flattery, and thanks should be spread
freely among your “partners” and “associates” within the U.S.
government.
It might be a good idea for BP to establish a shadow
212. See U.S. COAST GUARD, Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew
Members Aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of
Mexico, April 20-22, 2010, Action by the Commandant (2011), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/dw/exhib/Volume%20I%20-%20Enclosure%20to%
20Final%20Action%20Memo.pdf (outlining the U.S. Coast Guard’s additional actions
to improve safety and regulatory oversight in the wake of the disaster).
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representative for each pivotal federal official encountered. We
want the federal version of the facts to be your version.
Functionally, any “joint information center” should become a
BP information center.213 Ideally, U.S. government officials
should be knocking at BP’s door for information rather than
the other way around.214
2.

“Proprietary” Response Efforts

It is important for BP management and employees to
recognize that, however unwillingly, our firm is already in
discovery mode with respect to the many potential legal
claims. Let us suppose that the Spill spreads to 88,000 square
miles.215 If this occurs, our firm would seek to “control” and
“contain” all information about the impact and its
consequences regarding the entire Gulf: on the sea, above it,
and under it. Your company will not be served by
indiscriminate public scrutiny of this scene. It will not be
served by flyovers,216 drive-bys, fortuitous sampling,
eyewitnesses to wildlife suffering, and film of the all-toonormal feather-bedding.217 It has been said that “safety is not
213. On BP’s public relations efforts:
As with the cofferdam, BP struggled with public communications surrounding the
top kill. At the time, both industry and government officials were highly uncertain
about the operation’s probability of success. One MMS employee estimated that
probability as less than 50 percent, while a BP contractor said that he only gave
the top kill a “tiny” chance to succeed. But BP’s Hayward told reporters, “We rate
the probability of success between 60 and 70 percent.” After the top kill failed,
that prediction may have lessened public confidence in BP’s management of the
effort to control the well.
2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 150 (footnotes omitted). See also
SAFINA, supra note 18, at 51 (“We will now play a game called BP Says. BP says it’ll do
this; BP says it’ll try that; BP says it has ideas; BP says it needs a month”); id. at 105
(quoting Admiral Allen on BP, “They are necessarily the modality by which this is
going to get solved.”).
214. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 151 (footnote omitted)
(“Most symbolically, the federal government stopped holding joint press conferences
with BP. From June 1 on, Admiral Allen gave his own daily press briefing.”).
215. SAFINA, supra note 18, at 266 (88,000 square miles—37% of Gulf federal
waters—closed to fishing at the height of the spill).
216. SAFINA, supra note 18, at 127 (“The flow BP is getting good at stopping is the
flow of news. When folks at Southern Seaplane . . . call the local Coast Guard-Federal
Aviation Administration command center for routine permission to fly a photographer
. . . over part of the oily Gulf, a BP contractor answers the phone. His swift and
absolute response: Permission denied.”).
217. Compare 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 98 (Don Cornett, Exxon
Public Relations Manager stating “Our operation was enormous. At the peak, as I
recall, we had over 12,000 employees in Alaska.”), with id. at 136 (Roy Robertson,
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proprietary,”218 but we suggest that BP implement a policy
stating that all matters pertaining to response, cleanup, and
damage assessment are entirely “proprietary.”219
The “Exxon Blueprint” will be highly useful in developing
the corporate strategy for responding to this oil spill. Like
Exxon, BP is starting from ground zero220 and must make a
good show of its cleanup efforts; Exxon was able to accomplish
this by conspicuously moving bodies, and BP should follow in
their footsteps.221 Cleanup actions may be wildly experimental
and reckless, focusing always on that which can be seen and
not on that which matters.222 In this way, managers of the
cleanup enterprise can make ample use of fakes, feints and
adjustments.223 Appearances can be cleaned up with greater
Seldovia Resident stating that BP “just wanted to cover it up and say it was clean.”).
218. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 217.
219. David Carr, A Disaster Privately Managed, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/business/media/14carr.html (discussing whether
BP could clarify the obvious failure of the top kill and quoting a BP official, who states
that “[g]iven recent volatility in BP share price, I’m told that information related to top
kill is now considered stock-market sensitive, which means it has to be managed under
disclosure rules for the London and N.Y. stock exchanges”).
220. 2011 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 51. See also 2009 PERSONAL
STORIES, supra note 9, at 194, 195 (Walt Parker, Chair, Alaska Oil Spill Commission
explaining that oversight of oil shipment was “completely disregarded” after an
adverse court decision in 1979; and state that “all the recovery equipment was buried
under several feet of snow when the Exxon Valdez hit the reef.”).
221. On the clean-up efforts, John Devens Jr., Cleanup “Scrounger:”
Most of us working on the cleanup understood right away that we were being paid
to put on a big show. When the helicopter flew over and people saw lots of activity,
they had no idea whether it was effective or not . . . We had been cleaning
approximately 100 yards of beach per day, and suddenly Big Bob told us “At the
rate you guys are going, this will take years to clean up. From now on we’re going
to make a quarter-mile of beach a day” . . . I started thinking about it, and there
was only one way we were going to make that quota. We started booming off
clean beaches next to oiled beaches. . . we made our quota.
2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 111–13.
222. Otto Harrison, Exxon Cleanup Manager on the clean-up efforts:
We decided that, although we didn’t have the equipment to clean up yet, we would
provide workers with rags and towels, and put them to work as best we could.
Almost everyone has seen photographs in which we had hundreds of men and
women on the shoreline, wiping off rocks with rags.
Id. at 114–115.
223. See, e.g. id. at 99, 100, 102 (Stan Stephens, Valdez Tour Boat Operator stating
that “The Exxon Valdez is a perfect example of no one taking blame or responsibility”);
Harry Allen of EPA on the use of Corexit despite its toxicity:
Exxon had begun the beach cleaning process. When they brought in the cleaning
agent, which was the oil dispersant Corexit, the EPA determined that it could be
toxic to the intertidal invertebrates adjacent to the surfaces being cleaned, and the
Regional Response Team (RRT) denied approval for its use as a surface washing
agent. Exxon agreed to reformulate the dispersant and EPA agreed to help
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ease and at lower cost than the reality of rocks and sand. In
the end this “cleanup” will be conducted largely by the wind,
the waves and the tides.224
For the moment, though, the old friends of the industry—
boom, skimmers, dispersants and fires—will dominate cleanup
efforts. BP’s claims of cleanup capacity have been a bit
overwrought here, which will result in public relations issues.
For example, in the recovery plan, BP stated it had the
stunning capacity to remove 491,721 barrels of oil per day.225
By our firm’s calculations, assuming a best-case scenario, BP
might get halfway to that cleanup goal in seventy-five days.226
BP has also laid claim to a significant mechanical recovery
capacity, which could be true only if “significant” means
capacity to remove less than 900 barrels per day.227
Necessarily, BP will face other awkward moments because the
preferred tertiary cleanup strategy (dispersants) will probably
undercut the utility of BP’s primary (boom) and secondary
(skimmers) cleanup techniques. Frankly, our firm knows that
these boom and skimmers will be of little use in removing
oil.228
expedite its ‘relisting’ as a surface washing agent.
Id. at 103, 104; Joe Bridgman, Public Information Officer, Alaska Dep’t of
Environmental Conservation on Exxon’s obfuscation:
I can’t recall the number of carcasses, but say by the middle of summer there were
135,000 carcasses. [We actually counted them.] Exxon came out in the media,
saying essentially, “These are only estimates.” . . . It was that kind of endless
dissembling by Exxon that we were battling . . . Every time Exxon told a lie, we
would respond with the truth. . . . That’s when I realized that Exxon had done the
old bait-and-switch trick. Through studying the photographs and comparing them,
it was a certainty that their “before” pictures were of one beach and their “after”
pictures were of another beach.
Id. at 118, 121–22. See also id. at 132, 134 (Charles Wohlforth, Reporter, Anchorage
Daily News stating that “The animal rescue was another more harm than good story”).
224. 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 106, 107 (Clyde Robbins, Vice
Admiral, West Coast, U.S. Coast Guard stating, “One of the things that some pretty
important people said during those meetings was that we might be better off doing
nothing and letting Mother Nature take care of it. But doing nothing wasn’t an option,
ever. We had to do something even if it was just looking busy.”).
225. See FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 14.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. Quoting Thad Allen:
So we had eighty-five days of a different spill coming to the surface in a different
way in a different place every day, depending on winds and current conditions. We
had a hundred thousand different patches of oil from Louisiana to Florida.
Because the oil spill contingency plan didn’t call for enough equipment, we were
behind the power curve for six or seven weeks. We had three kinds of responses to
the oil; skim it, burn it, or disperse it.
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Boom

A boom is a “floating barrier serving to obstruct
navigation”229 and intercept oil. BP will need its own navy to
pick up this boom, distribute it and place it where it might
help the cleanup. Exxon saw this need in its day, recruited its
own navy from parts unknown and from suddenly-out-of-work
fishermen, paid them well, and put them to work on the boom
and other matters. BP should follow the Exxon strategy by
hiring a navy of vessels, calling it perhaps the “Vessels of
Opportunity Program.”230 BP should ensure the mariners on
these vessels are well-trained,231 well-dressed,232 and
comfortable.233 Proper training should include instruction on
the wisdom of not talking to the press.234 These mariners
should be well paid, even if the business of the day requires
that they sit in port. In theory, these mariners will be paid and

SAFINA, supra note 18, at 282. See id. at 277 (“Boom is easily defeated”); id. at 245
(quoting a worker: “every time we find a large enough mass to actually be able to do
some productive skimming, they just hit it with dispersants.”); FREUDENBURG &
GRAMLING, supra note 7, at 156 (emphasis in original) (“Skimmers work well with
thick oil in swimming pools, and booms can cordon off oil spills in small ponds, if there
is no wind.”); 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 140, 141 (“fish pump” actually
“sucked up oil. But the minute the officials saw how well it worked, they pulled it off
our boat and replaced it with a skimmer that could not pick up the heavy debris mixed
with the now hardened oil.”); JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at 94 (finding that three
percent of lost oil is skimmed, five percent is burned).
229. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 196 (2d college ed. 1982).
230. See 2011 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 140–41. Compare JACOBSEN,
supra note 111, at 73 (“there were about three thousand VOOs, as everyone called
them, operating in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana”), with id. at 74 (“All flew the
triangular VOO flag and all seemed to be zipping about with minimal coordination.”).
231. On the “beauty” of training, see SAFINA, supra note 18, at 185.
232. On the clothing requirements see:
I notice that everyone aboard all the other boats wears a silly little orange life
jacket, the uniform of Being Paid, even in water calm enough to reflect one’s
tightening anger. Most professional fishermen have probably never in their lives
worn a life jacket on a boat. But of course BP wants to ensure safety on the job.
Unlike while drilling in mile-deep water and risks galore.
Id. at 143.
233. Compare id. at 160 (“If you come back here, you’d have to get a BP
representative to come with ya. This is a BP safety area. You need a hard hat, steeltoed shoes, safety glasses”), with id. at 189 (“It’s hot. And because it’s so hot, BP’s
beachside cleanup workers—30,000 of them—are told to work for twenty minutes and
rest for forty. For $12 an hour, the work is sweaty and uncomfortable, but not overly
taxing.”).
234. Id. at 127–28 (discussing BP’s strategy of limiting journalist’s access to
information).
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trained to place boom.235 In fact, boom will probably not figure
in the outcome other than to satisfy the political cravings of
the local parishes.236
b.

Skimmers and Controlled Burns

Skimmers are devices for removing floating matter from
liquid.237 Despite the boastings of increases in size, strength
and vast capacities, skimmers will never be able to pick up
more than a tiny fraction of spilled and dispersed oil.238
Recovering spilled milk from the sidewalk would be easier.
Regardless of effectiveness, BP must use the skimmers
because there are many available and they could be of
marginal service for burning and targeting dispersant.
Two compelling legal reasons recommend a burn policy. One
is that anything not burned will be hauled ashore. Once
ashore, the collected oil will be subject to stringent and
cumbersome laws regarding hazardous and solid waste. These
are the lessons learned by Exxon in Prince William Sound and
by the post-Katrina experience of the oil industry in the Gulf.
First, a loud and angry constituency will advocate for treating
this debris as “hazardous waste” under another federal law
known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA),239 an outcome that would shrink your disposal options
substantially. Even were we to prevail on that point, all things
hauled ashore would be “solid waste,”240 which triggers a
235. 2011 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 141 (explaining that “[p]lacing
boom requires skill and training, and responders differed in their judgments of how
much the vessels contributed.”).
236. Compare SAFINA, supra note 18, at 144 (“This boom is useless against [the oil].
You might as well stretch dental floss across your bathtub to hold soapy water to one
side.”), with 2011 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 151–54, (“eye candy” for the
observer).
237. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1147 (2d college ed. 1982).
238. Compare 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 185, 186 (quoting Al Burch,
Kodiak Commercial Fisherman that “[o]nce we were able to get the oil, what do you do
with it? There weren’t enough skimmers. The ones that were available didn’t work
very well, once the oil got outside of Prince William Sound, because it was so thick.”),
with JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at 94 (“That all those thousands of Vessels of
Opportunity and professional skimming vessels had managed to skim only 3 percent of
the oil strikes me as a debacle of the first order.”).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2006) (defining hazardous waste).
240. Id. § 6903(27). We have asked Sen. James Inhofe to look into this matter on our
behalf. See Superfund: Information on the Nature and Costs of Cleanup Activities at
Three Landfills in the Gulf Coast Region (letter to Sen. Inhofe from David C. Trimble,
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somewhat less onerous regime of regulatory oppression. Here,
too, we propose a “burning at sea” cleanup strategy as a way to
get around RCRA.
There is a second important factor that recommends a
thorough and sweeping burning strategy. Under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) it is a crime to “take,” or to
solicit another to take, any individual member of an
endangered or threatened species.241 Similarly, it is a crime
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to engage
in the “taking” of any marine mammal.242 Substantial
penalties and jail time accompany a conviction. But these laws
generally do not condemn the “taking” of carcasses,
endangered or otherwise. Thus, debris-burning of deceased
wildlife is not hampered by these laws. While our firm cannot
urge BP to commit a crime, we point out that this strategy of
“cleansing by fire” collaterally works to remove evidence of
forbidden “takes” that may be claimed against BP. Please note
that there is an International Convention discouraging the
burning of wastes at sea.243 We will leave it to the State
Department lawyers to determine whether the United States
is violating this convention. BP certainly is not.
c.

Dispersants

Dispersants appear to have fallen through a legal crack to
BP’s advantage. There are several ways in which dispersants
might have been classified that would have restricted their
use; apparently, though, legal mechanisms have failed to
detect their potential negative ramifications. First, the Clean
Water Act (CWA) forbids the deliberate discharge of huge
volumes of chemicals of unknown or poorly known ingredients
so dispersants might have been treated as “pollutants.” If that
had happened, the “effluent data” (knowledge on that which is
discharged) in all likelihood would have been “available to the
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government
Accountability Office) (Feb. 18, 2011) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11
287r.pdf.
241. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), (g) (2006).
242. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2006).
243. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution By
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, As Adopted by the Special Meeting of
Contracting Parties to the London Convention 1972 art. 5, Nov. 7, 1996 (contracting
parties forbid “incineration at sea of wastes and other matter”).
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public.”244 This legal path was not followed. Dispersants could
be treated as a “chemical substance or mixture” under Section
4 of the Toxic Substances Control Act,245 which could have
resulted in a stringent safety and environmental testing
regime.246 This did not happen either. Luckily for BP, the U.S.
legal regime seems to allow the party responsible for an oil
spill to attack it by any dispersant available, regardless of the
hazard.247
How did BP emerge with such a favorable outcome? Legally,
the oil industry has managed to sidetrack and insinuate the
use of dispersants into the command structure of the National
Contingency Plan. The oil industry has worked for years to
make this happen in the United States. The efforts have
invented “precedents” around the world (hundreds of oil spills
have been treated with dispersants) and this has yielded a
“customary” practice embraced by nations, advisory bodies and
“scientific” enterprises.
Be that as it may, as we interpret the present legal
landscape, the simple act of prelisting dispersants under the
National Priorities List248 invites BP to use any listed product,
244. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR & WATER 589 (West
1986) (discussing Section 308(b)(2), 35 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(2) (still in effect)).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2006).
246. John S. Applegate, The Government Role in Scientific Research: Who Should
Bridge the Data Gap in Chemical Regulation?, in WENDY WAGNER & RENA STEINZOR,
EDS., RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 255, 268 (Cambridge U. Press 2006); see WILLIAM H. RODGERS,
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, 427–28 (Thomson
West 1988) (footnotes omitted). See also David Markell, An Overview of TSCA: Its
History and Key Underlying Assumptions, and Its Place in Environmental Regulation,
32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 333 (2010).
247. SAFINA, supra note 18, at 197 (“taking bolt cutters to the food chain”). If people
really are concerned about dispersants, we recommend that you bring your influence
to bear on the Coast Guard to crack down on “cowboy” and “vigilante” usage:
The irony reached an apotheosis worthy of Kaftka when, after its planes had
carpet-bombed the Gulf with the world’s entire supply of Corexit, the Coast Guard
delivered signs to Gulf Coast marinas that said “WARNING: THE USE OF SOAPS OR
OTHER DISPERSING AGENTS TO DISSIPATE OIL IS MORE HARMFUL TO THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT THAN IF THE OIL HAD BEEN LEFT ALONE. USE OF THESE AGENTS
WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT IS AGAINST THE LAW. YOU
MAY BE PENALIZED UP TO $32,500 FOR EACH INCIDENT!!”

See JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at 141.
248. See UNDERSTANDING OIL SPILL DISPERSANTS, supra note 136, at 22 (2005)
(describing processes for “pre-approval” and other authorizations); Helen Chapman et
al., The use of chemical dispersants to combat oil spills at sea: A review of practice and
research needs in Europe, 54 MARINE POLLUTION BULLETIN 827 (2007); INSTITUTE OF
PETROLEUM, GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF OIL SPILL DISPERSANTS (2d ed. Aug. 1996).
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trade-secret protected or not, regardless of unreasonable risk,
available data on toxicity and effects on wildlife,249 amounts
used250 or means applied. Frankly, we always have believed
that the best way to hide something from the Coast Guard is to
put it at the bottom of the sea.
This strategy has a substantial upside—liabilities are higher
if the oil reaches sensitive environments, lower if it is made to
disappear, lower yet if known damage is displaced by unknown
damage and still lower if unseen damage creeps into and
comes to rest in never-before-researched deepwater
environments.
Environmentalists will criticize BP for unwarranted
experimentation on the environment of the Gulf and its people.
But there is no experiment because there is no baseline, no
hypothesis, no orderly development of data and no plausible
methodologies. BP will find, as Exxon did,251 that publicspirited science has difficulty getting organized to investigate
massive and far-reaching assaults on the physical
environment. Even eye-witness accounts, normally of some
import in law, can be dismissed as “anecdotal” in the context of
dispersant use as these accounts are unscientific and therefore
unreliable.252 Which dispersant product should BP use? BP can
See also Tip Wonhoff, Chemical Dispersants & the BP Oil Spill: Never Before Used at
Depth, paper prepared for Law B565, U.S. Coastal & Ocean Law, Univ. of Washington
School of Law, Spring 2010.
249. Quoting a tugboat Captain on an aerial bombardment with dispersants:
I don’t know if those dolphins were around for that or not. I don’t know if the
pilots would have aborted the mission if they had spotted them in the target area.
Probably not, I imagine. I only hope the dolphins somehow knew what was going
to happen and got the hell out of there. I don’t even want to think about what
would have happened to them if they didn’t.
SAFINA, supra note 18, at 245.
250. Compare:
By April 30, BP has begun sending dispersants down a mile-long tube from a ship.
Releasing such chemicals on the deep seafloor—rather than spraying them on
surface oil—has never been done before. It’s a secondary toxic leak, this one
intentional, sent from above to meet the oil coming from below.
SAFINA, supra note 18, at 54, with id. at 278 (quoting Thad Allen, “[T]wo things went
off scale; one was the total amount of oil; the other was that when the protocols were
written, no one envisioned injecting dispersants at depths of five thousand feet.”).
251. 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 53, 54–55 (discussing the
experimental use of dispersants by Exxon to clean up the Exxon Valdez spills which
were incredibly dysfunctional and included problems such as improperly working
nozzles, a drop on a Coast Guard crew and several unsuccessful drops).
252. Compare SAFINA, supra note 18, at 113 (statement of Tony Hayward on worker
safety: “Food poisoning is clearly a big issue.”), with id. at 109 (statement of Tony
Hayward on the use of heavy drilling fluid: “[N]ever tried this before in water this
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choose based on availability and cost, but need not consider
environmental impact. Our firm understands that Corexit is
available in volumes up to two million gallons.253 BP may
proceed immediately to pour the world’s entire supply of Mr.
Clean into the Gulf, which will significantly diminish removal
costs.
In sum, our firm estimates that the “removal” costs BP will
face should not exceed one billion dollars. As a bonus, a good
portion of this spending on removal efforts will diminish the
overall natural resource damages because, theoretically, the oil
is being removed and our efforts will reduce the damage to the
natural environment.
E.

Natural Resource Damages: Squaring Things with Nature

BP’s fifth category of liability is for natural resource
damages (NRD). This theory of damages has been widely
embraced by the U.S. legal system since it was introduced in
the 1973 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act.254 This idea
rests firmly upon a number of fashionable and dangerous
notions—such as polluter pays, the precautionary principle, an
eye-for-an-eye corrective justice and “restoration” to
baseline.255
This so-called NRD regime threatens BP with losses of many
billions of dollars, including “loss of use” claims, which will be
especially daunting. There is, however, some good news, which
is that Exxon succeeded in keeping its NRD liability under one
deep.”) and id. at 95 (statement of Tony Hayward: “There aren’t any plumes.”) and id.
at 89 (statement of Tony Hayward: “[N]ot our accident.”).
253. Compare Mark Sappenfield, New Gulf Oil Spill Mystery: How Much Dispersant
Did
BP
Use?,
CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR
(Aug.
1,
2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2010/0801/New-Gulf-oil-spill-mystery-Howmuch-dispersant-did-BP-use (One estimate: 1.8 million gallons, with 800,000 gallons
administered on the Gulf floor.), with Jeff Goodell, The Poisoning, ROLLING STONE
(July 21, 2010), http://www.rolingstone.com/politics/news/17390/183349 (The Corexit
board includes several veterans of the oil industry.).
254. VALERIE ANN LEE & P.J. BRIDGEN, THE NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT DESKBOOK 9 (2002) (citing Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. II, 87 Stat. 584 (1973)
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651–65). Under this Act, the holder of the
pipeline right-of-way was made “strictly liable to all damaged parties, public or
private, without regard to fault for such damages, and without regard to ownership of
any affected lands, structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources relied
upon by Alaska Natives, Native organizations, or others for subsistence or economic
purposes.”
255. See generally id.
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billion dollars.256 It has still been kept on the defensive,
though—mostly as a result of its acceptance of the so-called
“reopener clause” in its 1991 NRD settlement.257
Exxon was obliged to confront the 1977 Amendments to the
Clean Water Act,258 which said that the trustees can recover
the costs of “replacing or restoring” lost natural resources.259
BP is now up against the ghost of the Clean Water Act, which
shows up conspicuously in the Oil Pollution Act’s (OPA)
“measure of damages.”260 It considers:
A. the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or
acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged natural
resources;
B. the diminution in value of those natural resources
pending restoration; plus
C. the reasonable cost of assessing those damages.261
Measuring damages by the “cost of restoring” is the clearest
example of a Congressional purpose to protect “nature’s
baseline” from unwelcome assault. The process of NRD focuses
on corrective justice; that is, putting things back the way they
were before the event occurred and compensating for losses
that take place between the injury and the restoration. The
statutory terms of “restoring, rehabilitating, replacing” frame a
wounded nature nursed back to health. The deed of “acquiring
the equivalent” declares casualties should be redressed by
recruitment and replacement with new personnel. Together
these terms, dangerously, constitute the boldest of pledges to a
natural world: “We will protect you as if these vandals were
never here.”
This NRD law is a righteous and reckless retribution
machine. Our firm will endeavor to protect BP from being run
over by it. The good news is that this dangerous NRD weapon
256. The Exxon Valdez Reopener, supra note 20, at 149.
257. See Rhonda McBride, ExxonMobil in $93M Battle Over Unforeseen Damages in
1989 Spill, KTUU.COM (November 13, 2011), http://www.ktuu.com/news/ktuu-exxonin-a-93-million-dollar-battle-over-unforseen-damages-in-1989-spill-20111115,0,63740
25.story; William Yardley, 22 Years Later, the Exxon Valdez Case is Back in Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/us/04 exxon.html (on
the “reopener”).
258. Clean Water Act § 311(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (2006).
259. Id. § 1321(f)(5).
260. Id. § 2706(d)(1)(A)–(C).
261. Id.
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has been narrowed and blunted with the passage of time. Two
major rulemakings have gone down the NRD road262 and U.S.
industry lawyers have succeeded in snatching back some of
what appeared to have been ceded away by these dangerous
acts of Congress. For example, OPA regulations define “injury”
as “an observable or measurable adverse change in a natural
resource or impairment of a natural resource service.”263
Further, to establish injury trustees must determine whether
there is:
• Exposure, a pathway, and an adverse change to a
natural resource or service as a result of an actual
discharge; or
• An injury to a natural resource or impairment of a
natural resource service as a result of response
actions or a substantial threat of a discharge.
To proceed with restoration planning, trustees also
quantify the degree, and spatial and temporal extent of
injuries. Injuries are quantified by comparing the
condition of the injured natural resources or services to
baseline, as necessary.264
These definitions alone would defeat many natural resource
damage claims. Injury does not happen in the NRD framework
unless the loss is observable or measurable. It is rarely either
one.265 Nature is notoriously uncooperative in these
calculations. Determing “exposure, a pathway, and adverse
change” might work for an auto accident, but the tactic is
unlikely to work well for sensitive ecological damage. Life in
the ocean is an evolutionary process, not a stable state, which
makes change inevitable and judgments about the “adverse”
direction informed guesses. Also, remember this “adverse
262. LEE & BRIDGEN, supra note 254, ch. 10 (discussing content of both CERCLA
and OPA natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) regulations).
263. 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2010) (emphasis added).
264. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, INJURY ASSESSMENT:
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT UNDER THE OIL
POLLUTION ACTION OF 1990 1–4 (1996).
265. E.g., Susan Milius, Scientists Try to Identify and Track Elusive Larvae in a
Boundless Ocean, SCIENCE NEWS, Jan. 15, 2011, at 19 (explaining the difficulties of
studying larvae that are “mere squiggles of still-developing tissue,” are “fiendishly
hard to identify,” “don’t carry a lot of diagnostic characteristics,” look like “cartoon
aliens,” “are more like dandelion fluff blowing in the wind,” have to survive as “bitesized nuggets in open water,” disperse widely and proceed unnoticed by “typical
monitoring programs”).
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change” must present itself “as a result of an actual discharge.”
This little qualifier of causation hides a squadron of defenses
dressed up as cause in fact or proximate cause. Exxon beat the
rap for its destruction of the herring fishery with a version of a
cause-in-fact defense.266 And “proximate cause,” of course, is an
open-ended defense allowing wrong-doers to walk away from
any consequences deemed “surprising” to narrow-minded
human beings.267
1.

Proximate Cause Defenses

For restoration planning, the law requires a “quantification”
of the injury and a comparison to the “baseline.” Corporate
polluters such as BP can only relish the opportunity to contest
these factors. Baselines for comparison rarely exist, and in all
probability none exist at all for BP spill-impacted species in
the Gulf of Mexico. Just what were the baseline populations for
the world’s largest fish (the whale sharks), its most valuable
(the Bluefin tuna), or the Kemps’ Ridley sea turtle or the
brown pelican?
In a wonder of proven wonders, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico once established that an oil spill caused the
decline of 4,605,486 organisms per acre.268 This calculation was
achieved by surveys of oiled and unoiled areas. The damage
was not “observable,” but it presumably was “measurable.”
With twenty acres affected, this meant that a grand total of
92,109,720 marine animals were killed by the SS Zoe

266. Compare Sanne Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages
After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 95 (2009), with Dr. Stanley D.
Rice, Persistence, Toxicity, and Long-Term Environmental Impact of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 55 (2009).
267. Compare General Elec. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 776–77,
779 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (refusing to accept the government’s argument that a “trustee”
could meet its proof requirement merely by demonstrating “injury,” “exposure,” and a
“pathway.” A “causation” defense appears to be in order.), with:
NOAA’s brief conceded that “[t]he trustee must establish causation to the
satisfaction of the district court,” a position the agency reiterated during oral
argument, while also acknowledging that this interpretation of the final rule
would bind the agency in any future proceedings. The court expressly adopted
NOAA’s construction of its final rule that the trustee must “prove causation.”
Craig H. Allen, Proving Natural Resource Damage Under OPA 90: Out with the
Rebuttable Presumption, in with APA-Style Judicial Review?, 85 TULANE L. REV. 1039,
1052 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
268. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 660–661 (1st
Cir. 1980).
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Colocotroni oil spill that precipitated the study.269 But
remember, any change must be adverse, and who is to say that
fewer mollusks and more polychaete is an “adverse” outcome
for an ecological condition?
The “exposure,” “pathway,” and “adverse injury” must occur
“as a result of an actual discharge.” Here hide the mysteries of
causation. Restoration planning requires quantification “by
comparing the condition of the injured natural resource” to the
“baseline.” We will happily contest this elusive “baseline.” Any
“quantification” is an invitation to an argument—an argument
that our firm expects to win. In Zoe itself, the court of appeals
disapproved—much to our delight—a very clever valuation
technique that assigned a loss of at least six cents to each and
every organism killed.270
Frankly, the members of our firm are licking our chops to
defend BP in this NRD context. We expect ours to be the first
case where the court acknowledges that the spill killed billions
of organisms271 but that no “injury” occurred. The happy
outcome in the Zoe case leaves our firm wondering whether the
courts might disapprove any and all attempts to attach
economic value to larvae or phytoplankton in the ocean. In
2007, the U.S. Supreme Court did not even blink over the

269. See id. at 677 (disagreeing with the testimony of the expert economist that
valued each organism at six cents for total replacement costs of $5,526,583 (0.06 x
92,109,720)).
270. See id. at 661.
271. Compare:
[T]here must have been—I speculate—tremendous damage to sheer numbers of
those eggs and larvae. We should also bear in mind, however, that the numbers of
eggs and larvae are always far in excess of what the system can support. The
competition and struggle for existence is so intense that under normal, healthy
circumstances, only one fish egg in millions wins the lottery ticket for becoming an
adult. There is where a lot of the resiliency comes from. There may be enough
survivors to let the Gulf recover quickly.
SAFINA, supra note 18, at 250-251, with:
Early on we got ships out there to get baseline data of things like plankton and
Bluefin tuna larvae—as much as possible. When this disaster happened, justspawned shrimp and crabs and fish were in the drifting plankton. The plankton, I
think, could have been very seriously affected. Something like eighty to ninety
percent of the economically important fish populations in the Gulf depend on the
marshes and estuaries for part of their lives; they move back and forth. For them,
this could not have come at a worse time. But it’s next to impossible to
document—so far—what’s happened to them . . . We won’t know for a while—we
really won’t know for decades—but it’s likely it’s had very serious impacts.
Id. at 283–84 (quoting Jane Lubchenco). This last comment—from a world-class
biologist of considerable renown—makes us think twice about the wisdom of an Exxonlike reopener in our NRD settlement.
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Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) failure to ascribe
any value at all to billions of fish (both juveniles and adults)
lost in the course of utility use of cooling water.272 Precedents
such as Zoe and Entergy—that push living things to the
precipice of worthless—are formidable tools for disarming the
risks of NRD.
Despite these legal precedents, we do not expect the U.S.
government to acquiesce meekly in these assertions of
“worthlessness” or “causation not proven.” The U.S.
government will attach plausible values to all things lost,
including larvae. It will fight furiously, in a focused but
comprehensive way, to link our spill to detrimental declines in
natural resources. Predictably, two phases of proof will be
unfurled to establish that an injury is compensable from a
causation standpoint. The first, often termed general
causation, requires proof that the toxic substance can cause an
adverse effect—particularly the disease or injury in question.
The government must then prove the specific injury was
distinguishable from the background incidence of injury or
disease and therefore could be causally attributed to exposure
specifically from BP’s oil. This is often termed specific
causation. This distinction and the need to prove both is a
central object in both NRD and all toxic torts and will be a
great focus for defense—the Gulf of Mexico is full of other
people’s oil beside our own.273
We caution you also against expecting too much from the
“finger-pointing” defenses suggested by the celebrated
language in OPA (“result[ing] from”)274 and Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) (no “double recovery,” no recovery for damages
occurring “wholly before”).275 There is a similar formulation in
272. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009); see also DOUGLAS
A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR
OBJECTIVITY 224 (2010) (“In the EPA’s Phase II rulemaking . . . literally billions of fish
each year were simply ignored by the agency’s economic analysis, treated as if their
loss was meaningless because the question of their worth had been abandoned.”).
273. LEE & BRIDGEN, supra note 254, AT 201. See also Steve C. Gold, How Genomic
Information Should, and Should Not, Change Toxic Tort Causation, 34 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 371 n.4 (2010) (finding that the plaintiff must prove both, but “court’s ultimate
focus” is proof that individual plaintiff’s disease was caused by exposure) (internal
citations omitted).
274. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
275. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2006), with 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(3) (OPA
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the NRDA rules on the background presence of injury.276 It is
true that these legal fragments support a defense of “somebody
else did it.” But the usual suspects that are mentioned, e.g.
historic destruction of wetlands, Katrina, the infamous dead
zone, fishing mismanagement, even climate change, can be
distinguished without serious difficulty from oiling injuries.
On the important topic of quantification of environmental
damage that the NRD rules require,277 the industry has
succeeded in limiting two of the best techniques that claimants
have developed. One is the highly creative “body count”
technique applied in Zoe,278 where every creature killed would
cost no less than six cents. The other is the highly popular
contingent valuation technique where people are asked how
much they would pay to protect a particular resource. This
technique promised to inflate our liabilities to the point of the
unbearable.279 Courts have said that agencies can use the
“contingent valuation technique”280 but the industry continues
to criticize this valuation method. We expect to keep the
memory of Zoe alive and the threat of contingent valuation at
bay.
2.

The Myth of Restoration Planning

We will not rehash the deficiencies identified in the stackedup contingency plans and the oil spill response plans.281 These
kinds of “get ready for something” plans are fanciful and
hypothetical. Planning failed in the Exxon case.282 Congress
prohibition on “double recovery”).
276. 43 C.F.R. § 11.16(d) (2010) (establishing that “damages or assessment costs
may only be recovered once, for the same discharge or release and natural resource”).
277. Id. § 11.70–.73 (describing Type B Procedures).
278. See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 661 (1st
Cir. 1980) (disapproving the Zoe technique).
279. Brian R. Binger, Robert Copple & Elizabeth Hoffman, Contingent Valuation
Methodology in the Natural Resource Damage Regulatory Process: Choice Theory and
the Embedding Phenomenon, 35 NAT. RES. J. 443 (1995).
280. General Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767, 772–74 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
281. See John Adams Hodge, How Environmental Regulators Can Address Human
Factors in Oil Spill Prevention Using Crew Resource Management, 40 ENVTL. L. REP.
11048 (2010); Denis Binder, Emergency Action Plans: A Legal and Practical Blueprint
“Failing to Plan is Planning to Fail,” 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 791 (2002).
282. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally
Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11041 (Nov. 2010).

2011]

STRANGER THAN FICTION

281

fixed the failure in the 1990 OPA,283 only to have the failure
fail again in the context of the Deepwater Horizon.284
These failures are of no concern. The old military view, that
no plan survives contact with the enemy, is widely subscribed
to in the oil industry. So far as our firm is concerned, short of
deliberate misstatements, BP may put anything it wishes in
its plans—so long as the plans are solemn, dutiful and
plausible.
Contingency plans are all about a “good story,” and good
stories can stray into the realm of the hypothetical or fictional.
No doubt some commission of the future will wag its finger at
the BP planning efforts. 285 BP should second this motion; it
should deplore its own efforts, flail its own lapses, pledge to try
harder, regret the shortcomings that occurred and insist that
company planning will drastically improve. These claims
might be exaggerations but the soft law of corporate planning
does not care.
Now the U.S. government does some planning too, and BP is
free to take an entirely different view of this planning. Under
OPA, for example, government trustees shall develop a “plan
for the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition
of the equivalent of the natural resources under their
trusteeship.” 286 BP’s response plan is a paper exercise, while
the government’s is a solemn contract. BP’s plan can be filed
and forgotten, but the U.S. plan will be remembered and
enforced to the letter of the law.
Thus, when it comes to the restoration plan to fix what went
wrong, the law has a sharper vision. Due process rushes to aid
industry. Trustees must trudge up the hill of NEPA
compliance, public participation, cost-effectiveness and
consideration of reasonable alternatives so long as they are not
excessively protective287 and so long as they embrace the do283. See 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 197 (stating that
“[p]eople have plan fatigue . . . they’ve been planned to death.”).
284. Id.
285. See e.g. id. at vii, ix (stating that “a series of identifiable mistakes . . .
systematic failures in risk management that . . . place in doubt the safety culture of
the entire industry . . . [N]either industry nor government adequately addressed these
risks . . . shortcomings in the joint public-private response to an overwhelming spill
and concluding that “[b]oth government and industry failed to anticipate and prevent
this catastrophe, and failed again to be prepared to respond to it.”).
286. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c)(1)(C) (2006) (emphasis added).
287. 43 C.F.R. § 11.82(b)(iii) (2010) (providing under CERCLA, alternatives “are
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nothing alternative of “natural recovery.”288 Restoration cannot
happen without restoration objectives specific to the injury and
a way of measuring success.289 There are prohibitions on
double recovery and restrictions on using “option” and
“existence” values.290 For the faint of heart who call this a
“double standard,” it is. The great corporations of the world
must be free to change and innovate. From our perspective,
governments are most useful when they are chained, limited
and hobbled by law.
One of the great achievements for industry in this context is
the invention of a new category of wildlife—“doomed”
resources. Government planners must consider the ability of
the resources to recover.291 If the resources cannot recover and
there is no plan for rehabilitation or restoration that could aid
the process, as in the case of one pod of killer whales following
the Exxon spill,292 the population will be “doomed” and
forgotten. If there is no plan for recovery there will be no
industry liability.
3.

Trustees

Third parties—notably the “joint” trustees and “outside”
scientists—will influence the outcome on NRD. BP must have
strategies for dealing with these third parties. The U.S.
government is stuck with the “coordination” duty under the
OPA regulations,293 and BP should be more than happy with
limited to those actions” that restore natural resources or services “to no more than
their baseline”).
288. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(b)(2) (2010) (stating that under the OPA, “[t]rustees must
consider a natural recovery alternative in which no human intervention would be
taken to directly restore injured natural resources and services to baseline”).
289. Id. § 990.55(b)(2) (“When developing the Draft Restoration Plan, Trustees must
establish restoration objectives that are specific to the injuries. These objectives
should clearly specify the desired outcome, and the performance criteria by which
successful restoration will be judged. . . .”).
290. Compare id. § 990.22 (double recovery), with 40 CFR § 11.83(c)(iii) (second-best
treatment of option and existence values).
291. 43 C.F.R. § 11.82(d)(7).
292. 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 203, 205 (quoting Craig Matkin,
Marine Biologist and Homer Resident after seven animals were lost from the AB pod
and eleven from the AT-1 transient group: “now we realize that this group of
transients may not recover and they’re probably headed for extinction.”).
293. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.14 (2010) (describing the coordination duty of trustees:
“[f]or joint assessments, trustees must designate one or more Lead Administrative
Trustee(s) to act as coordinators); see also NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
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this state of affairs. BP is on plausible legal grounds to
encourage—and close—any number of side deals it chooses to
make with individual state trustees. BP must work overtime to
undercut the “coordination” promised by the OPA regulations.
Latecomers may be fruitfully caught in our trap of “double
recovery.” Our firm will certainly argue “double recovery” at
every opportunity.
Will our strategy of rewarding defectors turn against BP if it
agrees to pay for some hare-brained scheme that has no hope
of helping a single fish or blade of grass in the Gulf of Mexico?
This worst-case scenario already has occurred (some are
calling it Jindal’s Folly), as Governor Bobby Jindal now
petitions BP “to get his one hundred miles of sand berms
built.”294 Our firm’s legal position must be that BP cannot be
expected to distinguish between valid and invalid demands
coming from a legally sanctioned trustee. That is, if the federal
government does not say “No” in a timely manner, BP has
every right to consider this silence a “Yes” and to offset the
costs against the collective NRD responsibilities of the joint
trustees.
BP must fully understand that this policy of separate deals
with individual trustees can lead to the collapse and
undermining of any collective effort, which will have its
greatest force on the topic of NRD. Frankly, we believe that
“divide and conquer” is a least-cost alternative for BP. We
recommend this strategy to help curtail both response costs
and liability for NRD.295
There is a huge risk, however, in the pursuit of any “divide
ADMINISTRATION, PREASSESSMENT PHASE: GUIDANCE DOCUMENT FOR NATURAL
RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT UNDER THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990, THE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REMEDIATION AND RESTORATION PROGRAM APP. J-1 (1996),
available at http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/library/pdf/PPD_AP-J.PDF.
294. SAFINA, supra note 18, at 271.
BP has agreed to pay a hefty $360 million for them. But the Environmental
Protection Agency is urging the Army Corps of Engineers to turn down the state’s
sand berm project, saying berms don’t do anything and can harm wildlife.
Ostensibly they’re to stop oil from contaminating shores and marshlands. Using a
May permit, the state spent tens of millions of dollars to build four miles of berms
. . . I suspect that this desire for berms stems from a fear of hurricanes, not oil. Is
my suspicion misplaced? Says Grand Isle’s mayor, “What is wrong with us
dredging and building these islands back up?”
Id.
295. Compare SAFINA, supra note 18, at 278 (Admiral Allen speaks of “the social and
political nullification” of the NCP), with id. at 201 (“Unified Command, my
[expletive].”).
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and conquer” strategy. Absent a U.S. sign-off, the federal
government will simply say that these “side deals” are part of
the “response costs,” not a part of NRD. That is a powerful
argument—probably a successful one—so “divide and conquer”
might succeed only if BP chooses to pay for it. We do not know
now where courts might draw the line between “restoration”
costs (for NRD purposes) and “removal” or “response” costs (for
cleanup purposes) but we do not expect any favors for BP in
the formulation of the U.S. legal strategy.
There is one conspicuous exception to our advice to work out
separate deals with trustees. This exception applies to the
Indian tribes. BP should not deal with them in any manner,
shape or form. Our firm realizes that the tribes are formally
incorporated into the structure of these NRD laws,296 but we
hope that none are sufficiently recognized to come against BP
in the Gulf.297 In previous litigation, our firm has confronted
tribes and has found them to be skillful and resilient
adversaries. They are not prone to the quick deals and ready
buyoffs that make state and local governments so shamefully
compliant. Some of the tribes actually see more in nature than
the usual dollars, and they are slow to give it up. We are
serious about this: we believe that other great corporations
have been bankrupted by the environmental concerns of
various tribes, and that the tribes should not be
underestimated.298 BP should know this especially, because
one of the “country” lawyers who worked on the Coeur d’Alene
case was the same fellow, Ray Givens, who caught BP earlier
this year in a devious series of lease violations on an allotment
owned by Alaska Natives.299

296. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a)(3) (2006) (NRD liability “to an Indian tribe for natural
resources belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to such Indian
tribe.”).
297. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2010) (defining “Indian tribe” as a tribe that is
“recognized”). Compare JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at ch. 2 (“The Last HunterGatherers in America”) with id. at ch. 8 (“The Last Days of Isle De Jean Charles”)
(Biloxi-Chitimacha Indians; Pointe-au-Chien tribe).
298. See Clifford J. Villa, Superfund v. Mega-Sites: The Coeur d’Alene River Basin
Story, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 255 (2003).
299. See Oenga v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 479 (2010), on reconsideration in part,
97 Fed. Cl. 80 (2011) (Firestone, J.).
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Dealing with the Science

The science of the matter will significantly influence the
extent of BP’s liability and any wrong results will be
financially painful to BP. Studies are likely gearing up to
measure “harm” to the Gulf and its creatures, and these
studies will probably be adverse to BP’s interests. Fortunately,
many great corporations—tobacco, chemical, and oil companies
among them—have developed sophisticated strategies for
managing the business risks brought on by scientific findings.
BP need not be a passive recipient of science. Instead, it can
actively influence the origins, development and content of
these studies. Additionally, BP can take an active role in
shaping public perceptions of the results. The leading playbook
on the topic identifies useful corporate strategies to shape,
hide, attack and package science. 300
One of the major categories of behavior for influencing the
content and reach of controversial science is described,
uncharitably, as “harassing scientists” and the “art of
bullying.”301 Our firm prefers to call this activity “employing
legal tools to probe the content of careless science that could do
damage to business enterprise.” Once again, Exxon set the
standard for this brilliantly nefarious practice. Exxon targeted
Steve Picou, a sociologist from the University of South
Alabama, who studied the social effects of the Exxon Valdez
spill—surely a topic of interest to would-be litigants. Exxon
subpoenaed Mr. Picou in an attempt to determine whether this
research was objective and impartial. Picou explains:
Exxon wanted every original survey with names and
addresses, plus every scrap of information that we had
accumulated over four years of studying the social
impacts of the spill. They claimed they wanted the
information in order to check the statistical analysis we
300. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 137, at 61, 97, 128, 181. We are looking into
who said this, why, and under what conditions: “[A] federal panel of about fifty experts
recommends continued use of chemical dispersants, saying populations of the
underwater animals likely to be killed have a better chance of rebounding quickly than
birds and mammals on the shoreline.” See SAFINA, supra note 18, at 114–15. We, of
course, are of the opinion that BP is free of NRD liability for losses of underwater
animals whose populations rebound quickly. They are already recovered. See generally
Charles L. Franklin, Dispersant Scrutiny Mirrors Larger Debate Over U.S. Chemical
Control Policy, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11142 (Nov. 2010).
301. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 137, at 157.
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had conducted and published in peer-reviewed journals,
which showed irrefutably that the social impacts were
extremely severe.
We had to provide copies of all our information,
including travel requests, travel reimbursement, and
food receipts. They even subpoenaed the faxes we had
used to communicate with our colleagues for sharing
information. It was absolutely ludicrous. Those nine
months of probings totally stopped the project and
completely disrupted the university’s sociology
department.302
Professor Picou added, “I made the decision that, if need
be—if ultimately I was ordered to—I would go to jail rather
than expose my respondents. Exxon was not getting our
confidential data.”303 He did not go to jail. The court handed
down a split decision but he learned a lesson about becoming
involved in the lawsuits of oil companies.
The Picou incident was so inspiring that it is was widely
emulated, including a long and delicate political campaign to
discredit Michael Mann, the creator of the so-called “hockey
stick graph” on climate change.304 This method has been
adopted and approved of by law under the Data Access Act,305
which obliges federally-funded scientists whose work is used to
“inform or support” regulation to turn over their data and
records under the Freedom of Information Act.306 Mess with
us, industry always has said, and we will mess with you.
BP has many options for combating the science storm
gathering in the Gulf. Our firm recommends immediately
buying or shaping science and hiding valid science by infecting
it with confidentiality clauses. The first tactic should cost no
more than fifty million dollars and consists of acquiring the
services of an entire academic department devoted to oceans
and ocean life.307 Tactic two is more expensive—perhaps
302. 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 273–74 (Steve Picou, Sociologist,
University of South Alabama).
303. Id. at 274.
304. MCGARITY & WAGNER 137, supra note , at 275–78.
305. Data Access Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495
(1998).
306. Id.
307. JACOBSEN, supra note 111, at 78 (stating that “[i]n addition to the Vessels of
Opportunity program, BP launched what I think of as the Scientists of Opportunity
program.”).
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costing $500 million—and requires pledging this large sum for
a ten-year research program managed by an expert panel,
open to all comers, apparently with no strings attached. Such a
program will certainly impress:
Rather, to its credit, I grudgingly admit, BP releases
$25 million of a pledged half billion dollars over ten
years to support several universities’ research into the
effects of the blowout. To make recommendations on
which institutions will receive funds, BP appoints an
expert panel chaired by environmental microbiologist
Rita Colwell, who formerly headed the National Science
Foundation and is now a distinguished professor at
Johns Hopkins University.308
BP would run few risks from employing this exercise. Any
contract that goes out will contain the usual clauses on BP
data “ownership,” reservations on “review of data” and
“permission to publish.” These clauses will leave BP in
complete control. It is our firm’s experience that most
university scientists, particularly in the biological sciences,
could care less about these sorts of constraints. They want to
get on with their work and avoid legal technicalities. Legal
help from universities to faculties is desultory at best, which
means that as a practical matter few scientists will question
these limitations. Those that do can reject BP monies “on
principle”—and be the poorer for it. In most cases these
clauses will be ignored and forgotten, but we like them because
they enable us to “pull the plug” on particularly obnoxious or
dangerous researchers, such as a Steve Picou or a Michael
Mann.
As soon as the flow of oil stops, BP must turn to a general
strategy of “packaging science.” BP must speak glowingly of
the recuperative powers of nature, underscore how concerns
were greatly overstated, and explain how wildlife has learned
to live with petroleum that always was extant in the natural
environment. The U.S. government, understandably, will be
anxious to express any “not-as-bad-as-we-feared” sentiments.
Knowing this, BP must be ready to exploit any windows of
opportunity that might occur.309 Our firm is in the business of
308. SAFINA, supra note 18, at 170.
309. See generally SAFINA, supra note 18, at 246–51 (reporting on the saga of “What
Happened to the Oil?” and the White House misstatements on the topic); JACOBSEN,
supra note 111, at 93 (Browner displaying “a sort of medieval understanding of

288 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:2

collecting every official government utterance that can be
interpreted as downplaying, minimizing or “taking the
optimistic view” on long-term environmental consequences. All
of this is potentially serviceable as admissions to contradict the
trustees’ eventual calculations of natural resource damages,
which will not be compatible with BP’s downplaying,
minimizing and optimism.
When the excitement subsides and the smoke settles, BP
will retreat to Exxon’s strategy—repeated, insistent and varied
denial of any long-term effects from the spill. Through
extended focus on public relations, BP’s voice will continue to
be heard as the others drop away.
5.

Liability Under Wildlife Laws

Finally, federal wildlife laws, particularly the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), which is often extolled for its harshness,
may play a role in BP’s liability. In the bigger picture, the
shreds of life of which we speak do not really matter because
the dollars are small and the legal risks quite tolerable.
Nonetheless, many people think much of these symbolic laws,
and they should be addressed with tender professional care.
We reiterate that BP had the fortuitous “foresight” to place
its spill, and the dispersants that cheered it along, into
completely unstudied and unknown “wilderness” regions of the
deep Gulf:
[U]nlike past insults, this one spewed into the depths of
the ocean, the bathypelagic zone (3,300–13,000 feet
deep). Despite the cold, constant darkness and high
pressure (over 150 atmospheres), scientists know that
the region has abundant and diverse marine life. There
are cold-water corals, fish, and worms that produce
light like fireflies to compensate for the perpetual night.
Bacteria, mussels, and tubeworms have adapted to life
in an environment where oil, natural gas, and methane
seep from cracks in the seafloor. Endangered sperm
whales dive to this depth and beyond to feed on giant
squid and other prey.310

biology”); John Collins Rudolf, Scientists Back Early Government Report on Gulf Spill,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/science/earth/24spill
.html (agreeing that nature and technology had largely done their job).
310. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 174. We are reminded of
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This BP Oil “disaster” will leave few footprints because it
occurred mostly in parts unknown. We enclose for BP’s library
a copy of the ten-years-in-the-making, first-ever global ocean
Census of Marine Life.311 This census combined the work of
over 2000 scientists from eighty-two nations. It is filled with
behind-the-scenes stories and breathtaking photographs. In
this deep marine environment, this oil spill could render a
species extinct before it is named or known. Philosophers will
talk about this for years. But there will be no legal liability.
Of the many water classification schemes operative in the
Gulf, two are of potential concern—“essential fish habitat”
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act312 and “critical habitat”
under the ESA.313 Preliminarily, it seems that BP successfully
assailed “essential fish habitat.”314
Try as we might, we see nothing in this ominous
classification scheme that forbids private parties from
entering, damaging or destroying “essential fish habitat.”315
“Critical habitat” has a richer legal history than does
“essential fish habitat.”316 With a number of subtle variations,
“critical habitat” is a specified geography “essential to the
conservation of the species” that “may require special
management considerations or protection.”317 The dreaded
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA states that each federal agency must
insure that its action “is not likely to jeopardize” a listed
the pioneers on the Oregon Trail who abandoned their broken-down pianos and dead
horses in the “wilderness” where nobody could see them.
311. DARLENE TREW CRIST, GAIL SCOWCROFT & JAMES M. HARDING, JR., WORLD
OCEAN CENSUS: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF MARINE LIFE (2009).
312. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(10) (2006).
313. Id. § 1532(5).
314. 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 178 (footnotes omitted).
315. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(10) (defining “essential fish habitat” as “those waters and
substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding or growth to maturity”).
The Councils are supposed to “minimize to the extent practicable adverse effects on
such habitat caused by fishing . . . .” Id. § 1853(a)(7). So far as we know, BP wasn’t
“fishing” on April 21, 2010, and the constraint is not enforceable against third parties.
See JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 481–84 (3d
ed. 1999).
316. See Kieran F. Suckling & Martin Taylor, Critical Habitat and Recovery, in THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY (Island Press 2006, Dale Goble, J. Michael Scott,
and Frank W. Davis, eds.); see also Wyatt Golding, Could It Have Mattered? Assessing
the Policy and Implementation of Critical Habitat Designation Through the Lens of
Deepwater Horizon (2010) (for the LAW B565 U.S. Ocean and Coast Law advanced
writing seminar, University of Washington School of Law).
317. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
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species “or result in the destruction or adverse modification” of
critical habitat.318
Our firm’s brief conclusion is that BP’s oil has not yet
entered “critical habitat” but that it is likely to do so in short
order. Even were serious damage to be done, we do not believe
that BP’s activity is constrained by the prohibition against
“destruction or adverse modification.” Even if it were, we
anticipate no circumstance that could rise to the hefty level of
“destruction or adverse modification.” Mere oiling by BP is not
the sort of annihilation these strict standards demand.319
The “take” provisions of the ESA, making it unlawful to
“kill,” “harm,” “capture” or “wound” any endangered species,
present bigger concerns for BP.320 There is a civil penalty of
“not more than $25,000 for each violation”321 and a
misdemeanor criminal violation that can yield a fine of “not
more than $50,000 or imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both.”322 For BP’s purposes, this basically amounts to a
body count—we do not want to hear that this sort of “take” is
“only a misdemeanor” and “hard to prove.” In Exxon’s case, the
United States surprised the company by picking up every
carcass that could be found and throwing it in a freezer. The
grand count for bird carcasses, as we recall, stopped
somewhere around 135,000, though most were not endangered
species.323 Based on the Exxon experience, our firm advises BP
to assume that each and every federal worker is out collecting
bodies and putting them into freezers. You might consider a
company collection effort of your own—out of respect for the
deceased.
Though we cannot swear to the particulars, we invite BP to
play the game of “body count.” We read the tales of many dead
Kemp’s Ridley sea turtles,324 large numbers of Bluefin tuna
larvae, “hideously oiled gulls and pelicans,”325 500 tarred-and318. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
319. Butte Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 607 F.3d 570, 583 (9th Cir.
2010).
320. See 16 U.S.C § 1532(19); see generally id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
321. Id. § 1540(a)(1). The “adjustments” upwards are ignored for the moment.
322. Id.
323. 2009 PERSONAL STORIES, supra note 9, at 121.
324. See SAFINA, supra note 18, at 284–85 (describing that Kemp’s Ridley sea turtles
were “hammered”).
325. Id. at 104.
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feathered birds, “350 dead or moribund loggerhead turtles,”326
birds sodden in goo, a hundred dolphins in distress, the whole
fauna of the sargassum weed “completely wiped out,”327 460
dead or injured sea turtles, fins of larval fish encased in oil,
one struggling dolphin, plankton seriously affected and eighty
oiled but still living birds.328 Not to mention the 500 sea
turtles, sixty dolphins and 2000 birds recovered dead.329 Each
oiled carcass might mean “ten to one hundred undetected
deaths.”330
After we do the Body Counting, there remains only the
math: 250 Bodies = 250 misdemeanors = 250 years in jail =
$12,500,000; or 750 Bodies = 750 misdemeanors = 750 years in
jail = $37,500,000. Environmentalists will argue that 250
different BP officers should serve the 250 misdemeanors. The
federal government will insist that any final settlement should
reflect some figure for the lost pelicans and turtles. Our firm
will demand that any amount assessed should be offset
elsewhere in the ledger sheet—probably in the category of
response costs. BP may offer a letter of contrition, perhaps a
pledge of remorse, which should be more than enough to close
the deal.
Among the species discussed above, BP perhaps ought to be
most concerned with the impact on Bluefin tuna. This is
because the United States has displayed a disposition to fight
for the Bluefin, and because the primary spawning grounds of
the western population of Atlantic Bluefin tuna is in the Gulf
of Mexico,331 with peak spawning season occurring between
April and June.332 The Bluefin is loved and pursued around the
world, and its numbers are plummeting. It is being severely
negatively impacted by the Deepwater Horizon spill but
fortunately for BP, it is not yet ESA-listed.333
326. Id. at 151.
327. Id. at 167.
328. Id. at 98,124,157,167,172,190,193,284, 298–99.
329. Id. at 222.
330. See SAFINA, supra note 18, at 222.
331. Steven L. H. Teo et al., Oceanographic preferences of Atlantic bluefin tuna,
Thunnus thynnus, on their Gulf of Mexico breeding grounds, 152 MARINE BIOLOGY
1105, 1106 (2007).
332. Id.
333. Petition to List the Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus thynnus) as Endangered
under the United States Endangered Species Act, CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 2
(May
24,
2010),
available
at

292 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:2

Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to be concerned
about the long-term impacts of the Deepwater Horizon on the
tuna. Because spawning occurs at the surface, adults entering
their spawning grounds were likely coated with oil. This
potentially impairs locomotion and causes skin lesions.334
Spawning is a metabolically-intensive time for tuna that
increases the rate at which they need to pass oxygen over their
gills. As such, “their gills are much more likely to capture tiny
droplets of oil suspended in the water column, the result of
dispersants used to break up the oil spill . . . .”335 Moreover,
even individuals that did not enter the spill zone might eat
contaminated prey.336 What we expect, ultimately, is that the
United States’ serious concerns337 over the long term health
over the Bluefin tuna population will carry over to the NRD
process and we will see a United States “best effort” to secure
restoration monies for the Bluefin tuna.
We have many defenses to supposed liability for species loss
in the Gulf. We will say that the damage happened “wholly
before” the oil spill and it was due to other causes. But we
recognize that the decline of the Bluefin tuna and other species
needs a scapegoat and BP is a nominee. In this instance,
perhaps, a strictly legal response may not be the best policy.
We are exploring a variety of charitable opportunities that
would allow BP to demonstrate conspicuous support for the
species restoration without compromising its larger legal
necessities.338 We will keep you posted and will seek your
advice on these sensitive matters.

http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/fish/Atlantic_bluefin_tuna/pdfs/BluefinTuna
Petition-5-24-2010.pdf.
334. Fact Sheet: Spawning Bluefin Tuna & the Deepwater Horizon Spill, TAG-AGIANT FOUNDATION 2, www.tagagiant.org/media/GOMspill_factsheet.pdf (last visited
Dec. 15, 2010).
335. Mark Schleifstein, Bluefin tuna particularly vulnerable to Gulf of Mexico oil
leak, NOLA.COM (May 13, 2010), http://nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/
bluefin_tuna_particularly_vuln.html.
336. TAG-A-GIANT FOUNDATION, supra note 334, at 2.
337. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Announcement of Tentative U.S. Negotiating
Positions for Agenda Items and Species Proposals Submitted by Foreign Governments
and the Cites Secretariat, FWS.GOV, 67–68, http://www.fws.gov/international/pdf/CoP
15notice4-CLEAN WEB tentative U.S. positions_final.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
338. See, e.g., JOHN HOFMEISTER, WHY WE HATE THE OIL COMPANIES: STRAIGHT
TALK FROM AN ENERGY INSIDER (2010) (by the former President of Shell Oil Co.).
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IV. CONCLUSION
BP’s liability for the largest spill in the history of the oil
industry is significant and vast if any evidence shows corner
cutting, measured safety risks and deviation from industry
standards. If such evidence does exist, however, the industrial
culture and systemic problems of managing risk within the
government oversight system will divert some blame away
from BP. In effect, we believe that many of the events leading
up to the disaster are due to the company’s reliance on
industry norms and failings of the larger system.339 Still, in
some ways, BP has been convicted in the eyes of the public
and the public expects the government to hold BP financially
accountable. If used strategically, the robust, post-Exxon
Valdez landscape of environmental law is capable of punishing
corporate environmental criminals through a complex formula
of criminal and civil fines, civil penalties, response costs and
natural resource damages. This formula represents a worst
case, and is emblematic of an archaic, aggressive and punitive
prosecution strategy against companies accused of
environmental crimes.
The government’s criminal enforcement choices and BP’s
defensive moves will shape the future of liability for
environmental crimes. As your counsel, we will use a collection
of legal precedents and tactical advice to expand upon BP’s
current defenses to erode environmental statutes and render
some traditional tort law obsolete. We will help BP displace a
potential DOJ criminal suit with a “deferred prosecution
agreement” and vague promises to mitigate damages in the
Gulf Coast through a private compensation scheme.
In addition to criminal fines, civil penalties are likely to land
at one billion dollars. This penalty estimate is merely a
jumping-off point for government negotiations, and will be
weighed against BP’s considerable success in minimizing and
mitigating the effects of the discharge. BP undoubtedly has the
upper hand in these negotiations as it is within the interest of
the US government that harsh civil penalties take a backseat
to the broader policies of economic progress and security.
Determining civil damages will be a long, drawn-out and costly
affair, but damages can be controlled by a favorable forum of
339. See 2011 NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 217.
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BP’s choice. A portion of the estimated civil damages of thirty
to forty billion dollars in liability should be dedicated to the
creation of an “independent” compensation scheme that will
sufficiently expedite and minimize claimants’ recovery. In the
process, BP will successfully accomplish a wholesale
transformation of US tort law and corrode common law
protections that aid claimants in the right to recovery.
In the 1990s’ post-Exxon Valdez legal system, Congress
thrust responsible parties into a role of primary responsibility
for the cleanup. Through our efforts, response costs will be
kept within reason by a huge, disciplined, ambitious and welldefined “takeover” of the critical leadership functions and
human resource management. Taking ownership of the
response puts BP in the driver’s seat; it provides access and
influence over decision-making and information collection and
it establishes critical relationships with the Gulf States and
federal government. Success in the NRD phase relies on these
relationships, as the NRD process is as much a negotiation as
anything else. Success also requires anticipation and planning
during the cleanup and careful “management” of the ongoing
science. The science and economics that go into modern
damage assessments are complex and full of surprises,
especially in the area of contingent valuations. We must
immediately make it clear to the trustees that these novel
methodologies will not stand up in court.
Successful use of legal precedents, tactical defenses and the
creation of a novel compensation system will minimize BP’s
accountability and damages for the Gulf Oil Spill, and in the
process, undermine the liability scheme designed to punish
and deter future corporate environmental crimes.
Respectfully,
Bendini, Lambert & Locke

